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INTRODUCTION

For nearly three decades, the phrase "least restrictive
alternative" (LRA) has been an essential element of mental
disability law.1 From its constitutional roots in a 1972 Wisconsin
federal district court decision,' through the enactment of statelevel "Patient's Bill of Rights" statutes,' and through the articles
of nearly every scholar who has written seriously about this
question,4 the concept of the least restrictive alternative-the
idea that restrictivity of confinement can and must be calibrated
and evaluated-has remained one of the core staples of mental
disability law. Initially employed in the mental disability law
context in an involuntary civil commitment case (limited to the
question of whether an individual need be institutionalized
against her will in an in-patient psychiatric hospital), the use of
the concept has expanded to consideration of restrictivity of
conditions within an institution,6 adequacy of treatment,7 (in
1.
See generally 1 MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND
CRiMINAL §§ 2A-4.4 to -4.4a, at 121-32, §§ 2C-5.3 to -5.3e, at 417-34 (2d ed. 1998)
[hereinafter 1 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW].
2.
Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1096-97 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (holding that a
state commitment procedure was constitutionally defective because it failed to require
those seeking commitment to consider less restrictive alternatives). See generally 1
PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, supra note 1, § 2A-4.4a, at 126-32, § 2A-4.4c, at 13942.
3. E.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 33.01-33.21 (McKinney 1996); see generally 2
MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL §§ 3A-14 to -14.5a, at
125-47 (2d ed. 1999) [hereinafter 2 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW].
4. See, e.g., 1 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, supra note 1, § 2C-5.3, at 417-18
n.828, 419 n.842.
5.
Lessard, 349 F. Supp. at 1096-97. The use of the LRA in other areas of
constitutional law predated Lessard by over a decade. Refer to notes 98-110 infra and
accompanying text.
6.
See, e.g., Goodwin v. Shapiro, 545 F. Supp. 826, 847-48 (D.N.J. 1982) (indicating

2000]

PROMISES OFPARADISE

1001

some cases) a patient's right to refuse treatment,' the right to
community aftercare and/or de-institutionalization, 9 and even to
cases involving prisoners transferred to mental hospitals1" and
insanity acquittees seeking release.
In the twenty-eight years following Lessard v. Schmidt,
however, the underpinnings of the doctrine had become
somewhat murkier. In 1982, in Youngberg v. Romeo,"' the
Supreme Court declined to give the least restrictive alternative
constitutional status, articulating instead a constitutionallyminimal standard of "reasonably nonrestrictive confinement
conditions."13 This new language did not cause any states to
statutorily revise their involuntary civil commitment standards, 4
that mental patients could only be restricted to the extent clinically necessary or
necessary to the hospital's internal order and security, but not for administrative
convenience).
7. See, e.g., Gary W. v. Louisiana, 437 F. Supp. 1209, 1216-19 (E.D. La. 1976)
(requiring the hospital staff, when preparing treatment plans for each mentally retarded
child, to consider the least restrictive alternative for that child); Scott v. Plante, 641 F.2d
117, 129-31 (3d Cir. 1981) (asserting that a mental patient who had been involuntarily
confined to the maximum security section of a psychiatric hospital had a right to have his
confinement to other less restrictive settings within the hospital carefully considered),
vacated, 458 U.S. 1101 (1982). For a subsequent case, see In re James, 547 N.E.2d 759,
761-62 (IM. App. Ct. 1989) (illustrating that the absence of a report on appropriateness
and availability of alternative treatment facilities and a preliminary treatment plan
required commitment reversal).
8. E.g., Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836, 845-47 (3d Cir. 1981) (abandoning the LRA
doctrine in drug refusal cases), vacated, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982).
9. See, e.g., Doe v. Knauf, No. Civ. A. 91-187, 1992 WL 672296, at *3 (E.D. Ky.
Aug. 24, 1992) (holding that plaintiffs have a private right of action to enforce rights of
juveniles placed in facilities, including the right to be placed in facilities that are the least
restrictive alternative appropriate to the needs of the child and the community).
10. See Jackson v. Peele, 22 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 2445 (D.D.C. 1978). See also
Johnson v. Levine, 450 F. Supp. 648, 657-58 (D. Md. 1978) (holding that actively
psychotic prisoners and others needing treatment should be transferred from an
overcrowded prison to an appropriate state mental institution), affd in part and
remanded in part on other grounds, 588 F.2d 1378 (4th Cir. 1978); United States ex rel.
Souder v. Watson, 413 F. Supp. 711, 717 (M.D. Pa. 1976) (requiring the same due process
guarantees afforded to prisoners for the commitment to mental hospitals as are given to
nonprisoners).
11. See In re Portus, 371 N.W.2d 871, 872-73 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985) (finding that the
trial court should have considered alternatives to hospitalization and whether continued
hospitalization was correct for a man who was institutionalized following his acquittal by
reason of insanity); In re Commitment of J.L.J., 481 A.2d 563, 565-67, 569-71 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984) (concluding that three former defendants, who were found not
guilty by reason of insanity of their respective crimes, and subsequently institutionalized,
had a constitutional right to the least restrictive environment appropriate to both the
protection of society and the defendants' individual rights).
12. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
13. Id. at 324.
14. See 1 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, supra note 1, § 2C-5.3c, at 426 ("The
Youngberg decision.., has had little impact on the application of the LRA doctrine to the
commitment process.").

1002

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[37:999

but it certainly slowed doctrinal expansion, especially in cases
involving the right to refuse treatment. 5 The state of the law
became even more muddled a decade later when, in Riggins v.
Nevada," the Court reinvigorated the doctrine in the context of a
case involving the criminal trial of a competent-to-stand-trial
insanity defense-pleader, holding that a "least intrusive means"
or "least restrictive alternative" methodology must be used in
answering the question of whether such a defendant had the
right to refuse the involuntary administration of antipsychotic
medications at trial. 7
Notwithstanding this endorsement of the LRA doctrinealbeit in a fact situation far removed from the typical involuntary
civil commitment case-doctrinal and theoretical developments
continued to stagnate. The LRA was an integral part of
involuntary civil commitment law (on the books, at least), but
few contemporary judicial opinions spent much time thinking
about its contours, its implications, its limitations, or the
relationship between Riggins and psychiatric hospitalization in
civil cases and/or community treatment. 8
Although the 1990 passage of the Americans with
Disabilities Act 9 could have logically and reasonably been seen
as auguring a reversal of this trend,0 few developments in the
subsequent nine years suggested that such a reversal was likely.
Notwithstanding explicit regulatory language mandating that a
"public entity shall administer services, programs, and activities
in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of
qualified individuals with disabilities,"" few ADA cases ever
spoke to LRA concerns."
15.
See Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266, 269-70 (3d Cir. 1983) (rejecting a "least
intrusive means" standard for administering antipsychotic drugs to involuntarily
committed mental patients and utilizing professional judgment to make medication
determinations); 2 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, supra note 3, § 3B-5.10, at 246
(discussing this aspect of the Rennie remand opinion).
16.
504 U.S. 127 (1992).
17.
Id. at 129-30, 135-36. See also 2 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, supra note
3, § 3B-8.3, at 327 (discussing this aspect of Riggins).
18.
See, e.g., Jurasek v. Utah State Hosp., 158 F.3d 506, 511 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing
Riggins and stating that "[olur reasoning is further supported by the Supreme Court's
application of the principles enunciated in [Washington v.] Harper [, 494 U.S. 210 (1990)]
to a pretrial detainee who had been found incompetent to stand trial, but had not been
civilly committed").
19.
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
20.
See, e.g., Guido S. Weber, Unresolved Issues in Controlling the Tuberculosis
Epidemic Among the Foreign-Bornin the United States, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 503, 535
(1996) ("ADA standards are synonymous with due process standards already in place,
such as an individualized assessment and using the least restrictive alternatives.").
21.
28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (1999) (emphasis added). See also 42 U.S.C. §
12182(b)(1)(B) (1994) ("Goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and
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The 1999 Supreme Court decision in Olmstead v. L.C.,'
however, may serve to reverse this trend of inaction and may
resuscitate and revitalize the constitutionally-grounded LRA
principle in mental disability law. Olmstead qualifiedly affirmed
an Eleventh Circuit decision that had ruled that the ADA
entitled plaintiffs-residents of Georgia Regional Hospital-to
treatment in an integrated community setting as opposed to an
"unnecessarily segregated" state hospital.24 In writing the
majority opinion, Justice Ginsburg stressed that "[ulnjustified
isolation.., is properly regarded as discrimination based on
disability,"25 and ordered that states be required to maintain "a
comprehensive, effectively working plan for placing qualified26
persons with mental disabilities in less restrictive settings." 27
This explicit endorsement of the ADA's "integration mandate"
forces us to reconsider the role of the least restrictive alternative
in mental disability law, how courts assess such cases, and the
range of evidence admissible at involuntary civil commitment
hearings. Olmstead also, by specifically incorporating "least
restrictive alternative" language-albeit in a case that it
specifically denominated as statutory and not constitutional 2 8forces each state to reconceptualize both the involuntary civil
commitment hearing and the periodic review process.2 9
This Article proceeds in the following manner. First, I
provide an historical perspective with a brief overview of the
pattern and practices of institutional segregation that have been
accommodations shall be afforded to an individual with a disability in the most integrated
setting appropriate to the needs of the individual.").
22. One of the few exceptions is City of Newark v. J.S., 652 A.2d 265, 274-78 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1993) (holding that a statute authorizing the involuntary
commitment of a homeless person suffering from tuberculosis was not invalid, but that
the statute would have to be construed to include rights required by the Americans with
Disabilities Act, and rights required by contemporary standards of due process, including
the least restrictive mode of isolation). See also Michael L. Perlin, "Make Promises by the
Hour5: Sex, Drugs, the ADA, and Psychiatric Hospitalization,46 DEPAUL L. REV. 947,
974-75 (1997) [hereinafter Perlin, Promises by the Hour] (discussing City of Newark v.
J.S.).
23. 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
24. L.C. v. Olmstead, 138 F.3d 893, 895, 897 (11th Cir. 1998), affd in part, vacated
in part by 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
25. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 597.
26. Id. at 605-06.
27. 28 C.F.R. pt. 35 app. A (1998).
28. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 588.
29.

Refer to Part I.B infra. See generally PERLIN, MENTAL DisABILrY LAW: CIVIL
§ 6.44AA, at 83-94 (Supp. 1999) [hereinafter PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY

AND CRIMINAL

LAW (Cum. Supp. 1999)]; Michael L. Perlin, "I Ain't Gonna Work on Maggie's Farm No
More": Institutional Segregation, Community Treatment, the ADA, and the Promise of
Olmstead v. L.C., 17 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 53 (2000) [hereinafter Perlin, Maggie'sFarm].
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the hallmark of American in-patient psychiatry, then a review of
the development of the least restrictive alternative doctrine
(beginning with the trail-blazing decision in Lessard, postLessard constitutional developments, and statutory reform), a
consideration of the functional role of the involuntary civil
commitment and periodic review hearing, and a (regretful) postmortem-in the wake of PennhurstState School v. Haldermanfor constitutionally-based "right to community treatment"
litigation.
Next, I look briefly at the ADA, and then tackle the heart of
the paper-the impact of the ADA and Olmstead on institutional
segregation and the potential rebirth of a constitutionally-based
least restrictive alternative after Olmstead (keeping in mind that
Olmstead was not a constitutional case). I believe that, after
Olmstead, involuntary civil commitment/periodic review hearings
must be expanded to consider-as an element of the commitment
process-an inquiry into the restrictivity of confinement, and, at
such hearings, evidence of the impact of institutional segregation
and the availability of community treatment alternatives should
be admissible (a change of focus that will force counsel to assume
an expanded role at such hearings). Courts will also be forced to
reconceptualize the meaning of "restrictivity of confinement" at
such hearings, a reconceptualization that parallels suggestions
that right to refuse treatment law be guided by a calibration of a
"continuum of coerciveness." Olmstead may also revive interest
in constitutionally-based community treatment litigation, and
may force us to reconsider the trend-exemplified by New York's
passage of "Kendra's Law"--of expanded outpatient commitment
initiatives.
I then explore several themes that have been at the core of
my recent work-the meanings of "sanism" and "pretextuality,"
and the role of "therapeutic jurisprudence." Here, I conclude that
Olmstead has tremendous (albeit still-untapped) potential for
combating both sanism and pretextuality in the involuntary civil
commitment/periodic review process, and that its expanded
role/use-as a tool to enforce the least restrictive alternative
mandate-is clearly therapeutic. I will conclude with some
recommendations and some thoughts as to how this may
potentially influence other aspects of institutional mental
disability law.
My title comes from Gates of Eden, Bob Dylan's brilliant and
transcendental" vision of an earthly paradise, a "quest for
30.
CRAIG McGREGOR, Introduction to BOB DYLAN: A RETROSPECTIVE 1, 2 (Craig
McGregor ed., 1972).
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on the human

Aladdin and his lamp
Sits with Utopian hermit monks
Side saddle on the Golden Calf
And on their promises of paradise
You will not hear a laugh
All except inside the Gates of Eden.33
Whether the song is borrowed from Blake (as Robert Shelton
suggests),34 or whether it is a song "that breaks bonds," that
"burst[s] forth... into freedom," 5 Eden is Dylan's demonstration
that "[tihe present world is one of illusion."36 To all too many
persons with mental disabilities, the LRA concept has forever
been little more than an "illusion." The Olmstead case, by
resuscitating the LRA doctrine, may prove to be a vehicle for
"salvation" for those inappropriately institutionalized. It
"promises... paradise." Whether that promise will be delivered
is still far from clear.

II. AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A.

The Roots of InstitutionalSegregation37

The history of psychiatric institutions in the United States
has been one of institutional segregation. An early history of a
Pennsylvania facility, for example, decried the lack of legal
protections made available to institutionalized patients:
31.
ROBERT SHELTON, No DIRECTION HoAmE: THE LIFE AND MuSIC OF BOB DYLAN
275 (Da Capo Press 1997) (1986).
32.
BOB SPITZ, DYLAN: A BIOGRAPHY 271 (1989).
33.
BOB DYLAN, LyRics, 1962-1985, at 174 (1995). I cannot resist one burst of selfreferentiality. I saw Dylan perform the world premiere of Gates in New York City in
October 1964.
34.
SHELTON, supra note 31, at 276.
35. Adventures in Chaos: Bob Dylan as Poet, at http-//www.jps.net/salvo/dylan.htm
(last modified Feb. 24, 1997).
36.
Bert Cartwright, Talkin' Devil with Bob Dylan, at http://users.powernet.co.ukl
barrettlrhe-Telegraplextracts/devil49.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2000).
37.
This section is adapted from 1 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, supranote 1, §
2A-2.1b to -2.1c. See also id. § 2A-2.1a (discussing the "European roots" of civil
commitment).
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In the earlier days of the Hospital, even down to quite
recent times, the mode of commitment of the insane was so
easy and free from formality that a few words hastily
scribbled upon a chance scrap of paper were sufficient to
place a supposed insane person in the Hospital and deprive
him of personal liberty.... A sufficient number of such
scraps of paper have survived to show the astonishing
informality of the lunacy proceedings. The friend (or it may
in some instances have been the enemy) of an alleged
lunatic, applied to the Managers, or to one of the
physicians, for an order of admission .... If the patient was
indigent he was admitted as a free case, after being seen by
one of the physicians and upon his report to the Managers
that the patient was a fit subject for detention. Once in his
cells, or quarters for the insane, the patient had no appeal
from the opinion of the attending physician. 38
A 1788 New York law, noting that "there are sometimes
persons, who by lunacy or otherwise are furiously mad, or are so
far disordered in their senses that they may be dangerous to be
permitted to go abroad," authorized two or more justices to direct
constables to "cause such person to be apprehended and kept
safely locked up in some secure place[,] ...and (if such justices
shall find it necessary) to be there chained." 9
At this time, it was considered critical that the "insane"
person be isolated as rapidly and effectively as possible from the
sources of his illness in the outside world." Commitment matters
were viewed strictly as administrative procedures, 4' and the
application of the local overseer of the poor was often seen as a
sufficient basis on which to place an "indigent insane" in a public
institution.42 Thus:
[Mfledical superintendents were also eager to leave
commitment laws as simple and as uncomplicated as

38. THOMAS G. MORTON, THE HISTORY OF THE PENNSYLVANIA HOSPITAL, 1751-1895
(rev. ed. 1897), reprinted in Thomas G. Morton, The PennsylvaniaHospital: Its Founding
and Functions, in THE AGE OF MADNESS: THE HISTORY OF INVOLUNTARY MENTAL
HOSPITALIZATION PRESENTED IN SELECTED TEXTS 13-14 (Thomas S. Szasz ed., 1973).
39.
1788 N.Y. LAWS, ch. 31.
40.
DAVID J. ROTHiAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER AND
DISORDER IN THE NEW REPUBLIC 143 (1971).
41.
NICHOLAS N. KITTRiE, THE RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT: DEVIANCE AND ENFORCED
THERAPY 64 (1971).
42.
Id.; ALBERT DEUTSCH, THE MENTALLY ILL IN AMERICA: A HISTORY OF THEIR
CARE AND TREATMENT FROM COLONIAL TIMES 420-21 (2d ed., Columbia Univ. Press 1949)
(1937). Thus, under Illinois law, a married woman who, in the judgment of the
institution's superintendent was evidently "insane or distracted, may be entered or
detained at the request of the husband .... without the evidence in other cases." 1851 Ill.
Laws § 10, at 96, 98 (emphasis added).
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possible. Most superintendents preferred to allow relatives
to bring the patient directly to the institution and arrange
for commitment on the spot; only a few believed that prior
judicial examination or jury decisions were necessary. The
managers of the Utica asylum, for example, objected
strenuously to legal formalities in its incorporation act that
made the certification of insanity under oath by two
"respectable physicians," a prerequisite for admission."
The first commitment "procedures" reflected the attitudes of
the hospital superintendents described by Rothman. According to
Professor Deutsch, commitment could be effected with "the
greatest of ease," and there were no specific legislative
safeguards to protect the personal liberty of the supposedly
mentally ill person until at least the second quarter of the
nineteenth century.4 4
As institutions proliferated-in Rothman's words, a "cult of
asylum swept the country"' 5 -"therapeutic concerns were slowly
being pushed into the background" 6 in a system in which the
"presence of larger hospitals tended 'to accelerate the thrust
toward greater reliance on institutional care of the mentally ill,
which in turn increased the demand for more facilities[,]...
result[ing in] a constant cycle of growth that resulted in larger
and larger institutions."" According to Professor Grob: "Faith in
administrative rationality was so pervasive that systematizers
often concluded that efficiency and policy were one and the same.
They assumed that efficient administration would ipso facto
create humane and effective public policies ..., 8
While several early state institutions for mentally ill persons
were led by enlightened superintendents49 who-following the
43.
ROTIHMAN, supra note 40, at 143; N.Y. Lunatic Asylum, Annual Report, 1 N.Y.
SEN. DOC. Nos. 20, 63, 81-82, 93, 123, 149 (1842); N.Y. Lunatic Asylum, Annual Report, 3

N.Y. ASSEMBLY Doc. Nos. 50, 56-59 (1843).
44.
DEUTSCH, supranote 42, at 420.
45.
ROTH MAN, supra note 40, at 130.
46.
GERALD N. GROB, MENTAL INSTITUTIONS IN AMERICA: SOCIAL POLICY TO 1875,
at 205 (1973) [hereinafter GROB, MENTAL INSTITUTIONS]. See also GERALD N. GROB,
MENTAL ILLNESS AND AinERicAN SOCIETY, 1875-1940, at 210-24 (1983) [hereinafter
GROB, MENTAL ILLNESS] (discussing how the formation of "boards" to operate mental
institutions led to an extensive bureaucracy that largely ignored the interests of mental
patients).
47.
James R. Elkins, Legal Representation of the Mentally Ill, 82 W. VA. L. REV.
157, 169 (1979) (quoting GROB, MENTAL INSTITUTIONS, supra note 46, at 191). For an
excellent and helpful overview, see S. A. Shah, Therapeutic Sanctions and Fundamental
Notions of Justice: A Basic Dilemma in Law and Mental Health Interactions, in
HARMONIE EN TEGENSPRAAK 317 (C. Kelk et al. eds., 1990).
48.
GROB, MENTAL ILLNESS, supra note 46, at 203.
49.
See John E. B. Myers, Involuntary Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: A
System in Need of Change, 29 VILL. L. REV. 367, 371-72 (1983-84) (discussing early
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seminal work of William Tuke and others'°--founded the "moral
treatment" movement, 5' "the great majority of mentally ill
persons who were public dependents remained unaffected by the
great psychiatric reforms of the time."52 According to Professor
Myers, "the forms of institutional neglect so poignantly described
by Dickens became the rule rather than the exception."" In light
of the increase in the number of institutions,54 "the serious
consequences of the total lack of legislation defining commitment
procedures became more and more manifest."55
Subsequently, the criteria for involuntary civil commitment
were established in state-by-state enactments that "'constitute [d]
the basic legislative pattern.. . in force [until the 1950's]," 6 and
remained "fairly static."" As late as 1960, the Iowa Supreme
Court held that involuntary civil commitment was not such a loss

superintendents at mental institutions who followed the moral treatment movement,
treating patients "in as normal and pleasant an environment as possible").
50. See generally George Mora, Historicaland Theoretical Trends in Psychiatry, in
COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY-II 1, 42-44 (Alfred M. Freedman et al. eds.,
2d ed. 1975). For a blistering social attack on Tuke, Pinel, and other "social reformers,"
see MICHEL FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION: A HISTORY OF INSANITY IN THE AGE
OF REASON 241-78 (Richard Howard trans., Vintage Books 1973) (1961).
51. According to Dr. John Talbott, the moral treatment movement called for
"humane treatment, kindness, open wards, pleasant surroundings, no or minimal
restraints, structured activity, and, above all, a familiar, if not parental relationship
between superintendent and patients, which included joint dining, walks in the
countryside, etc." JOHN A. TALBOTT, THE DEATH OF THE ASYLuM 16 (1978) (citing, inter
alia, Norman Dain, From Colonial America to Bicentennial America: Two Centuries of
Vicissitudes in the Institutional Careof Mental Patients, 52 BULL. N.Y. ACAD. MED. 1179
(1976)).
52. DEUTSCH, supranote 42, at 116.
53. Myers, supra note 49, at 373 (alluding to Charles Dickens's description of the
Pennsylvania Eastern Penitentiary in AMERICAN NOTES AND REPRINTED PIECES ch. VII
(London, Virtue and Co., Ltd.) (1842)).
54. For an economically deterministic point of view, see ANDREW I. SCULL,
DECARCERATION: COMMUNITY TREATiENT AND THE DEVIANT: A RADICAL VIEW 24 (2d ed.,
Rutgers Univ. Press 1984) (1977) ("I would contend that many of the transformations
underlying the move toward institutionalization can be more plausibly tied to the growth
of the capitalist market system and to its impact on economic and social relationships.").
55. DEUTSCH, supra note 42, at 422.
56. Myers, supra note 49, at 377 n.49 (quoting SAMUEL J. BRAKEL & RONALD S.
ROCK, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 8 (rev. ed. 1971)).
57. Myers, supra note 49, at 377. See 1 THE INSTITUTIONAL CARE OF THE INSANE
335-37 (Henry M. Hurd ed., Arno Press 1973) (1916-17) (describing commitment statutes
as of 1916); id. at 338-43 (describing rules governing institutional discharge). Thencurrent cases are summarized in 1 S.V. CLEVENGER, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE OF
INSANITY OR FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 443-45 (1898). See also Ellen Dwyer, Civil
Commitment Laws in Nineteenth-CenturyNew York, 6 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 79, 82, 96 (1988)
(evaluating the social role of civil commitment laws in one nineteenth century jurisdiction
and revealing that both families and communities used mental institutions as "long-term
holding places" for the "socially marginal and threatening").
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of liberty as to fall within the protection of the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 58
As of 1961, of the thirty-seven jurisdictions that provided for
some sort of judicial procedures to govern involuntary
hospitalization, only five couched the operative test for
committability solely in terms of dangerousness,59 and seven
provided no other basis for hospitalization beyond the patient's
need for care and treatment.6 In recognition that the language of
civil commitment statutes was "almost universally obscure," 1 the
commentary to the first major model civil commitment
legislation, the National Institute of Mental Health's Draft Act
Governing Hospitalization of the Mentally III,62 listed two

58.

Prochaska v. Brinegar, 102 N.W.2d 870, 872 (Iowa 1960). The court stated:
It must be kept in mind that Appellant is not charged with a crime and is
not so incarcerated. He is being restrained of his liberty in that he is not free to
come and go at will but such restraint is not in the way of punishment, but for
his own protection and welfare as well as for the benefit of society. Such loss of
liberty is not such liberty as is within the meaning of the constitutional provision
that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process
of law."

Id.
59.
THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 17 (Frank T. Lindman & Donald M.
McIntyre, Jr. eds., 1961) [hereinafter MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW]. See also id. at
44-51 (listing the statutory definitions of "mentally ill" in the thirty-seven jurisdictions).
60. Id. at 17. As recently as 1974, fifteen states allowed for compulsory
hospitalization based on a finding of a mental illness that rendered the individual in need
of care and treatment, a fit subject for hospitalization. Developments in the Law-Civil
Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1190, 1203-04 (1974) [hereinafter
Developments]. See also id. at 1204 n.14 (listing pertinent statutes). See, e.g., ALA. CODE
tit. 45, § 210 (1959 & Supp. 1973) (applying a standard of "sufficiently defective mentally"
to be committed). But see Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 387 (M.D. Ala. 1974)
(declaring the Alabama statute unconstitutional), superseded by statute as stated in
Garrett v. State, 707 So.2d 273, 274-75 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997).
61.
MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAw, supra note 59, at 20. See also Hugh Alan
Ross, Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Problems ofLaw and Policy, 57 MICH. L. REV. 945,
965 (1959) (declaring that commitment statutes are often "loosely worded," reflecting a
"bewildering array of commitment methods").
62.
NAT'L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, A DRAFT ACT GOVERNING HOSPITALZATION OF
THE MENTALLY ILL (Public Health Service Pub. No. 51, 1952) [hereinafter DRAFT ACT],
reprinted in MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW, supra note 59, at 397 app. A. The Draft
Act was seen as enormously influential. See, e.g., James E. Beaver, The "MentallyIll" and
the Law: Sisyphus and Zeus, 1968 UTAH L. REV. 1, 4 (1968); William J. Curran,
Hospitalizationof the Mentally ill, 31 N.C. L. REV. 274, 278 (1953) (noting that the Draft
Act specifically recognized that many mental patients do not have the capacity to make an
application for commitment); Sanford H. Kadish, A Case Study in the Signification of
ProceduralDue Process-Institutionalizingthe Mentally Ill, 9 W. POL. Q. 93, 97-98 (1956)
(stating that the Draft Act "represents a careful and painstaking examination of the
problems under discussion"); Gary D. Taylor, A Critical Look into the Involuntary Civil
Commitment Procedure,10 WASHBURN L.J. 237, 239 (1971) (explaining that the Draft Act
provided an alternative ground for the compulsory commitment of the mentally ill to
those accepted at the time). Subsequently, the Draft Act was proposed as a uniform law
model for the states to adopt. Note, Comments of a Draft Act for the Hospitalizationof the
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alternative grounds on which the involuntary hospitalization of a
mentally ill individual might be ordered: (1) the likelihood that
the individual will injure himself or others if he is not confined,
and (2) need of hospitalization and lack of sufficient insight or
capacity to make responsible decisions with respect to the
question of hospitalization."
The Draft Act, which envisioned a system in which
"indeterminate involuntary hospitalization" would be "under
judicial control from the beginning,"' provided for notice,"5 a full
hearing," continuing review of the propriety of detention,67 and
access on the part of institutionalized persons to the court to
effect discharges." This act became the impetus for a significant
number of revisions to commitment statutes in the late 1950s
and 1960s,69 reflecting "a trend toward restricting involuntary
civil commitment to the dangerous mentally ill and toward
limiting the type and increasing the severity of harm necessary
to support a finding of dangerousness.""
B. Development of the Least Restrictive Alternative Doctrine7
Perhaps no other principle has permeated the full body of
mental disability law and litigation as has the doctrine of the
least restrictive alternative. Although never specifically endorsed
by the U.S. Supreme Court before 1999 in a civil case involving
persons with mental disabilities,72 it has been invoked in
Mentally Ill, 19 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 512, 512-13 (1951) (discussing those groups that
helped prepare the Draft Act and the purpose of promulgating it to the various states).
See, e.g., State ex rel. Fuller v. Mullinax, 269 S.W.2d 72, 73 (Mo. 1954) (noting that
elements of the Draft Act were taken from the statutes of various states).
63.
DRAFT ACT, supra note 62, at 411. These grounds themselves were not
universally seen as models of clarity. See MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW, supra note
59, at 20 ("Even the Draft Act, which is considered as precise as any of the statutes, is
subject to a variety of interpretations.").
64.
DRAFT ACT, supra note 62, at 397-98.
65. Id. § 9(b), at 401-02.
66.
Id. § 9(f), at 402.
67. Id. § 18, at 404.
68.
Id. §§ 17(a), 18, at 404.
69.
See EDWARD B. BEIS, MENTAL HEALTH AND THE LAW 6 (1984). For a survey of
statutes compiled soon after the first wave of constitutional litigation in this area, see id.
at 297-321.
70. Developments, supra note 60, at 1205. This was a policy change to which the
legal commentators gave "nearly unanimous" support. Myers, supra note 49, at 379.
71.
This section is largely adapted from 1 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, supra
note 1, § 2C-5.3.
72.
See generally 2 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAw, supra note 3, § 3A-9.5
(discussing the Supreme Courtis use of the phrase "reasonably non-restrictive
confinement conditions" in Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982)). On the reemergence of the "least intrusive means" test in Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 135
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virtually every major challenge to the limitations of the
substantive involuntary civil commitment power, 73 as well as in
nearly every significant test case seeking a judicial declaration of
a right to treatment, 74 a right to refuse treatment,7 5 or a right to
aftercare and/or de-institutionalization.78 Moreover, this principle
has been incorporated in many civil commitment statutes,7 7 and
is routinely invoked at individual commitment hearings on a
daily basis.78 The importance of this doctrine to the fabric of the
commitment process cannot be overstated.
The LRA doctrine has its basis in the Supreme Court
doctrine that requires the government "to pursue its ends by
means narrowly tailored so as not to encroach unnecessarily on
important competing interests."79 While the legal roots" of the
LRA doctrine can be found in the early nineteenth century, l the
classic statement comes from Shelton v. Tucker,82 a 1960 case
invalidating an Arkansas law that had required all stateemployed teachers to file affidavits listing all organizations to
which they belonged or to which they made financial
contributions:83
(1992), see 2 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, supra note 3, § 3B-8.3. To be sure, the
Court's endorsement of the doctrine in Olmstead was not in the context of an involuntary
civil commitment case. Refer to Part II..B infra.
73.
See 1 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, supranote 1, § 2C-5.3b.
74.
See 2 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, supra note 3, § 3A-3.1.
75.
See id. § 3B-5.5b.
76.
See 2 MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND CRInMNAL ch. 7
(1989) [hereinafter 2 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW (lst ed.)].
77.
This, of course, is a relatively recent development. Compare Ingo Keilitz et al.,
Least Restrictive Treatment of Involuntary Patients:TranslatingConcepts into Practice,29
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 691, 709-10 n.101 (1985) (listing statutes in thirty-nine states that, as
of 1985, required courts to consider alternatives to hospitalization at time of involuntary
civil commitment proceeding), with David L. Chambers, Alternatives to Civil Commitment
of the Mentally Ill: Practical Guides and Constitutional Imperatives, 70 MICH. L. REV.
1108, 1139-40 n.140 (1972) [hereinafter Chambers, Alternatives] (listing statutes in the
only nine states that required a similar consideration of alternatives in 1972).
78. See 1 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, supranote 1, §§ 2C-5.3b to -5.3c.
79.
David Zlotnick, First Do No Harm: Least Restrictive Alternative Analysis and
the Right of Mental Patients to Refuse Treatment, 83 W. VA. L. REv. 375, 381 (1981)
(citing Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960)).
80.
Commentators have traced the doctrine's philosophical roots to the fourteenth
century principle of"Ockham's Razor." Keilitz et al., supranote 77, at 696-97.
81.
Zlotnick traces the LRA doctrine's first appearance in American jurisprudence
to Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 230-31 (1821). Zlotnick, supra note 79, at
385.
82.
364 U.S. 479 (1960).
83. Id. at 480, 490. Prior to Shelton, this phrase was employed more frequently in
commerce clause cases involving economic regulation. See, e.g., Dean Milk Co. v. City of
Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951) (holding that a state does not have unlimited power to
"protect the health and safety of its people, if reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives,
adequate to conserve legitimate local interests, are available"). See generally Richard B.
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In a series of decisions this Court has held that, even
though the governmental purpose be legitimate and
substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that
broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end
can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative
abridgment must be viewed in the light of less drastic
means for achieving the same basic purpose.
Subsequently, the Court has used a similar means of
analysis in cases involving such basic rights as freedom of
association,85 freedom to travel, 6 freedom to practice one's
religion,87 freedom to exercise the voting franchise,88 and privacy
between marriage partners.8 9 This doctrine has been interpreted
to require courts to "ensure that the state imposes no greater
constriction of freedom than necessary to serve [its] objectives""
in cases involving an attempt to regulate "constitutionally
preferred activities or constitutionally protected groups."91

Saphire, The Civilly-Committed Public Mental Patient and the Right to Aftercare, 4 FLA.
ST. U. L. REv. 232, 274-78 (1976) (discussing the origins of the least restrictive
alternative doctrine in constitutional law).
84.
Shelton, 364 U.S. at 488 (footnote omitted).
85.
United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 259-60, 265-66 (1967) (rejecting as
overbroad a statute that barred members of certain communist organizations from
employment at a defense facility because it impinged on the First Amendment rights of
free association).
86.
See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969) (holding that a state's
valid interest in preserving the fiscal integrity of its programs cannot be accomplished
through "invidious distinctions" between classes of its citizens); Aptheker v. Sec'y of State,
378 U.S. 500, 501-02, 505 (1964) (finding that a statute denying passports to certain
members of the Communist Party "too broadly and indiscriminately" restricted the right
to travel).
87.
See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406-07 (1963) (finding no valid
justification for the state to deny the appellant's right to receive unemployment benefits
due to her religious beliefs).
88. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 334, 343 (1972) (declaring that a
state must choose "less drastic means'" if there are other reasonable methods of achieving
its goals--especially when the proposed statute affects constitutional rights); Carrington
v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965) (explaining that the Constitution does not permit
discrimination based on voters' occupations).
89. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (stating that
laws affecting the privacy of the marital bedroom must be narrowly drawn).
90.
Chambers, Alternatives, supranote 77, at 1111.
91.
David Chambers, Right to the Least Restrictive Alternative Setting for
Treatment, in 2 LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY HANDICAPPED 991, 997 (Bruce J. Ennis
& Paul R. Friedman eds., 1973). The Supreme Court returned to this mode of analysis
earlier this year in determining that a cable television law, requiring cable operators
either to scramble sexually explicit channels in full or limit programming on such
channels to certain hours, was unconstitutional, in that the government failed to show
that this law was the least restrictive means of achieving the government's goal of
preventing children from hearing or seeing certain sexually explicit images. United States
v. Playboy Entm't Group, 120 S.Ct. 1878, 1882-83, 1888 (2000).
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It was thus "inevitable" that the LRA doctrine would be
applied to the involuntary civil commitment process," with its
attendant "massive curtailment of liberty,"93 that it would be seen
as a possible means of reconciliation between "civil libertarians
concerned about unwarranted intrusions upon individual
liberties and clinicians concerned more with successful treatment
than with temporary restrictions on personal freedom,"94 and that
it would become "a cornerstone in the developing body of law
dealing with the rights of mentally handicapped persons."95
C. ConstitutionalUnderpinnings"
The LRA doctrine was given constitutional life97 in the
mental health context for the first time in Lessard v. Schmidt."
There, the federal district court ruled that: "Even if the
standards for an adjudication of mental illness and potential
dangerousness are satisfied, a court should order full-time
involuntary hospitalization only as a last resort."99 Quoting
Shelton v. Tucker,' the court characterized "the most basic and
fundamental right" as "the right to be free from unwanted
restraint," 1 ' concluding that "persons suffering from the
condition of being mentally ill, but who are not alleged to have
committed any crime, cannot be totally deprived of their liberty if
there are less drastic means for achieving the same basic goal."'
Endorsing Lake v. Cameron,... the court placed the burden for
exploring alternatives to institutionalization on "the person
recommending full-time involuntary hospitalization,""4 who must
prove the following:
92.
Zlotnick, supranote 79, at 382.
93.
Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972).
94.
P. Browning Hoffman & Lawrence L. Foust, Least Restrictive Treatment of the
Mentally Ill: A Doctrine in Search of its Senses, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1100, 1102-03
(1977).
95.
Zlotnick, supranote 79, at 382.
96.
This section is adapted from 1 PERLIN, MENTAL DiSABiLrrY LAw, supra note 1, §
2C-5.3a. See also Michael L. Perlin, "Forthe Misdemeanor Outlaw": The Impact of the
ADA on the Institutionalizationof CriminalDefendants with Mental Disabilities,52 ALA.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2000) [hereinafter Perlin, Misdemeanor Outlaw].
97.
On the first statutory LRA cases, see 1 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, supra
note 1, § 2C-5.3a, at 419 (discussing Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966)).
98.
349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded, 414 U.S. 473 (1974).
99.
Id. at 1095.
100.
364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
101.
Lessard,349 F. Supp. at 1095-96.
102. Id. at 1096.
103.
364 F.2d 657, 660 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (stating that the state must bear the burden
of exploring alternatives).
104. Lessard, 349 F. Supp. at 1096. But see Ellins, supra note 47, at 225 (observing
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(1) what alternatives are available; (2) what alternatives
were investigated; and (3) why the investigated alternatives
were not deemed suitable. These alternatives include
voluntary or court-ordered out-patient treatment, day
treatment in a hospital, night treatment in a hospital,
placement in the custody of a friend or relative, placement
in a nursing home, referral to a community mental health
clinic, and home health aide services. 5
In analyzing the LRA in this context, Ingo Keilitz and his
colleagues listed factors to be considered in making such a
determination:
[T]he environmental restrictiveness of the treatment
setting; the psychological or physical restrictiveness of
behavioral, chemical, or biological treatments; clinical
variables, including the person's behavior as it relates to
the legal criteria for involuntary commitment; the relative
risks and benefits of treatment alternatives; the family and
community support available in the person's environment;
the quality or likely effectiveness of the alternative care
and treatment; the duration of treatment; the likelihood
that a person may pose a risk to public safety; the
availability, cost, and accessibility of alternative treatment
and care; the likelihood of the person's cooperation or
compliance with the conditions of alternative treatment
programs; and mechanisms for monitoring and reviewing
that compliance.0 6
Lessard's reasoning was subsequently adopted in other civil
0
commitment challenges,"
and was endorsed extensively in the
that the investigative function as to alternatives "may, as a result of inaction or
inattention by the mental health professionals, fall to defense counsel").
105. Lessard,349 F. Supp. at 1096.
106.
Keilitz et al., supranote 77, at 696.
107.
See, e.g., Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378,392 (M.D. Ala. 1974) (declaring that
"the state, which knows or has the means of knowing the available alternatives, must
bear the burden of proving what alternatives are available"), superseded by statute as
stated in Garrett v. State, 707 So.2d 273, 274-75 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997); Suzuki v.
Quisenberry, 411 F. Supp. 1113, 1132-33 (D. Haw. 1976) (reiterating the requirement
that less drastic means than commitment be investigated by the state); In re D.D., 285
A.2d 283, 286 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1971) (stating that "civil confinement for an
indefinite duration may be sufficiently inhumane so as to constitute cruel and unusual
punishment"); Kesselbrenner v. Anonymous, 305 N.E.2d 903, 905 (N.Y. 1973) (declaring
that "subject[ing] a person to a greater deprivation of personal liberty than necessary...
[is] violative of due process").
While the continued vitality of the LRA doctrine has been questioned in
treatment matters, see Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982); see generally 2
Perlin, Mental Disability Law, supra note 3, §§ 3A-9.5 to -9.7, its application to the
commitment process is consistent:
Mhe principle of the least restrictive alternative consistent with the legitimate
purposes of a commitment inheres in the very nature of civil commitment, which
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literature.1 "8 Again, Keilitz and his colleagues offered this
clinical/legal definition:
[The LRA] in involuntary civil commitment proceedings is
the combination of therapeutic and preventative
intervention provided by mental health and social service
providers that a) is conducive to the most effective and
appropriate treatment that will give the mentally
disordered person a realistic opportunity to improve his or
her level of functioning, and b) is no more restrictive of a
person's physical, social, or biological liberties than is
necessary to achieve legitimate state purposes of protecting
society and providing mental health treatment and care for
the individual.1 9
Other courts quickly expanded the scope of the LRA doctrine
beyond involuntary civil commitment decision making" to
include regulation of the conditions of confinement,"' the
availability of treatment,"' the right of a patient to refuse

entails an extraordinary deprivation of liberty justifiable only when the
respondent is "mentally ill to the extent that he is likely to injure himself or
other persons if allowed to remain at liberty." A statute sanctioning such a
drastic curtailment of the rights of citizens must be narrowly, even grudgingly,
construed in order to avoid deprivations of liberty without due process of law.
Lynch v. Baxley, 744 F.2d 1452, 1459 (11th Cir. 1984) (internal quotations omitted)
(quoting Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617, 623 (D.C. Cir. 1969)).
108.
For a collection of relevant scholarship, see Zlotnick, supra note 79, at 402-03
n.109.
109.
Keilitz et al., supra note 77, at 695-96.
110.
On the issue of the patient's right to a written treatment plan, see, for example,
In re Maxwell, 703 P.2d 574, 577 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that an order for
treatment which committed the patient to a program of combined in-patient and
out-patient treatment was void absent a showing that court was presented with an
approved written treatment plan); see also In re J.M.R., 505 A.2d 662, 663 (Vt. 1985)
(finding that the trial court could not continue involuntary treatment on a
nonhospitalized basis for an indeterminate time absent any finding that patient was
dangerous to himself or others, or that he would become so if the treatment plan was
discontinued). But see In re Harhut, 367 N.W.2d 628, 631 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (holding
that the trial court erred in prescribing specific treatment programs, in ordering the
county to prepare treatment reports and the hospital to submit a program plan to the
court, and in ordering the county to create community placements in a commitment
order).
111.
See, e.g., Scott v. Plante, 641 F.2d 117, 130-31 (3d Cir. 1981) (explaining that
the court has a "greater obligation to review constraints involuntarily imposed than it
does treatments a state offers to willing patients" before assigning patients to the
maximum security wing of a hospital), vacated, 458 U.S. 1101 (1982). For a subsequent
case, see In re James, 547 N.E.2d 759, 761-62 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (finding that the
absence of a report on the appropriateness and availability of alternative treatment
facilities and a preliminary treatment plan required commitment reversal).
112.
See, e.g., Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147, 165 (3d Cir. 1980) (declaring that
"[a] right to treatment does not create a corresponding duty to submit to any treatment
whatsoever"), vacated, 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
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treatment, 13 prison transfer hearings,"' and insanity acquittee
release hearings."' A series of Illinois cases, for example,
mandated that testimony as to mental disorder alone cannot
satisfy statutory criteria requiring the preparation of reports on
the appropriateness and availability of alternative treatment
settings."'
Although the concept is not without ambiguity, and while its
translation into individual involuntary civil commitment practice
has, at times, been "problematic,"17 its doctrinal importance as
"one of the most important trends in mental health law""8 cannot
be questioned."9
113.
See, e.g., Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1145 (D.N.J. 1978) (concluding
that the patient, rather than the doctor, has the ultimate power to end treatment).
114.
See Jackson v. Peele, (D.D.C. 1978), summarized in 22 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA)
2445 (stating that prisoner-patients are "entitled to the benefits of confinement in the
least restrictive alternative"); see also Johnson v. Levine, 450 F. Supp. 648, 658 (D. Md.
1978) (declaring that only actively psychotic prisoners and those others who need
immediate treatment should be transferred to an appropriate state mental institution),
affd in part and remanded, 588 F.2d 1378 (4th Cir. 1978); United States ex rel. Souder v.
Watson, 413 F. Supp. 711, 716-17 (M.D. Pa. 1976) (holding that the patient was deprived
of equal protection of the law because he did not receive adequate notice and a full judicial
hearing as is required for nonprisoners).
115.
See In re Portus, 371 N.W.2d 871,872-73 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985) (mandating that
an insanity acquittee be given a hearing to consider alternatives to continued
hospitalization); see also In re Commitment of J.L.J., 481 A-2d 563, 569 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1984) (declaring that the state must prove at a hearing that there exists a
substantial risk of dangerous conduct within the reasonably foreseeable future to justify
the further confinement of an insanity acquittee).
116. In re Venegas, 578 N.E. 2d 43, 45 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); In re Lamb, 560 N.E.2d
422, 424-25 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990); In re Blume, 554 N.E.2d 1100, 1104 (IlM.App. Ct. 1990).
But see In re Robinson, 601 N.E.2d 712, 718 (Ill. 1992) (reinstating commitment orders
and finding oral testimony to be sufficient where the patient does not object to the lack of
a written plan and the court is presented with all required information).
Bradley D. McGraw & Ingo Keilitz, The Least Restrictive Alternative Doctrine in
117.
Los Angeles County Civil Commitment, 6 WH=ITIER L. REV. 35, 35 (1984). For instance, in
In re J.R.R., 427 N.W.2d 137, 140 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988), while the court endorsed Lessard's
reasoning, it rejected a patienes argument that he was thus entitled to a court-ordered
placement in an open ward unit. The court construed state law, WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 51.20(13)(c)2 (West 1987), to require it to simply designate "the maxdmum level of
inpatient facility in which treatment can occur," and it further found treatment decisions
"beyond this due process consideration" to be "properly reserved for the medical
authorities." In re J.R.R., 427 N.W.2d at 140.
McGraw & Keilitz, supra note 117, at 36.
118.
Interestingly, there have been very few legal developments around the question
119.
of the cognizability of treatment issues at the civil commitment hearing. See generally 1
PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, supra note 1, § 2C-8.1.
In a New Jersey intermediate appellate case, the court reasoned that the "single
purpose" of a periodic review proceeding was "to determine whether [the patient] is
entitled to be or should be discharged." In re D.J.M., 386 A.2d 870, 872 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1978). If, however, a patient wished to raise an adequacy of treatment issue, he
could do so if he were to give notice to the court and "those who may be called upon to
discharge their duties to the patient so that they may be given an opportunity to prepare
for the proceeding and to appear and be heard." Id. at 872-73. In a subsequent decision,
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D. Post-LessardStatutory Reform 2
As courts unhesitatingly endorsed the "least restrictive
alternative" (LRA) concept in principle, state legislatures began
to apply it to state mental health laws. By 1985, thirty-nine
states required courts to consider alternatives to hospitalization
at the time of involuntary civil commitment.'
Of the few
jurisdictions without such a direct statutory requirement, several
grant the hearing court discretionary power to make such an
inquiry, 2 and others do so by administrative regulation."
While the term "LRA" is defined only in a handful of
statutes,"4 and while "legislative attempts to graft it onto civil
commitment laws and practice have [occasionally] met with
pointed criticisms,"" the fact that so many states" 6 have enacted
some sort of LRA legislation inevitably reflects a trend that
"likely will involve attempts to overcome superficiality and to
articulate the means by which personal freedom and treatment

however, another panel of the same court remanded for further proceedings a periodic
review case-involving an insanity acquittee-where the trial judge "may not have given
due consideration to appellant's need for more appropriate treatment of his mental
condition." In re Commitment of J.L.J., 509 A.2d 184, 185-87 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1985). Noting that the "right to treatment is an affirmative obligation on behalf of the
State," the court found that the evidence at the review hearing "certainly suggested that
the treatment afforded to [appellant] was not providing him with a meaningful
opportunity for cure or improvement," and remanded "for such further proceedings as
may be deemed necessary for consideration and implementation of an appropriate course
of psychiatric treatment." Id. at 186-87.
120. This section is adapted largely from 1 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, supra
note 1, § 2C-5.3b.
121. Keilitz et al., supra note 77, at 709-10 n.101. For a recent example, see N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.lld(b)(2) (West 1997).
122. Keilitz et al., supra note 77, at 710 n.101.
123. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 415.4 (1997). For a discussion of the
impact of this section, see Bradley D. McGraw et al., Civil Commitment in New York City:
An Analysis of Practice, 5 PACE L. REV. 259, 291-93 (1985). The scope of the LRA in New
York is spelled out in constitutional terms in In re Harry M., 468 N.Y.S.2d 359, 363-64
(N.Y. App. Div. 1983).
124. See Keilitz et al., supra note 77, at 710-11 n.102 (quoting statutes). See, e.g., GA.
CODE ANN. § 37-3-1(10) (1995); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202A-011(8) (Michie 1995); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 630.005(21) (West 2000); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-1-3(D) (Michie 1993).
125. Keilitz et al., supra note 77, at 711. For criticisms, see Hoffman & Foust, supra
note 94, at 1112-22; DAVID B. WEXLER, MENTAL HEALTH LAW: MAJOR ISSUES 144-54
(1981).
126. But see In re Brown, 493 A.2d 447, 451 (N.H. 1985) (finding that a statute, N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-B:32, V (1978), repealed, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135-C:40, V
(1996) permits but does not require placement in the least restrictive alternative). See
also id. (citing Thomas G. Gutheil et al., The Inappropriatenessof "Least Restrictive
Alternative"Analysisfor Involuntary Procedureswith the InstitutionalizedMentally Ill, 11
J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 7, 12 (1983) (stating that courts are often confused by the meaning of
the doctrine and frequently apply it erratically)).
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effectiveness
can be given equal consideration in the commitment
127
process."
E. The Significance ofYoungberg

128

In expanding the least restrictive alternative concept beyond
the involuntary civil commitment process, the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals held in Romeo v. Youngberg1 9 that involuntarily
institutionalized persons with mental disabilities had a right to
habilitation in the least restrictive alternative. 3 The U.S.
Supreme Court, in vacating the Third Circuit's judgment,'
declared a right to training and to "reasonably nonrestrictive
confinement conditions,""2 a phrase on which it neither
elaborated nor further defined."'
The Youngberg decision, however, has had little impact on
the application of the LRA doctrine to the commitment process,
and most subsequent cases have construed state statutes
carefully, with most courts continuing to demand relatively strict
adherence to the appropriate statutory provisions."4
127.
Keilitz et al., supra note 77, at 712. Cf In re Brungard, 789 P.2d 683, 687-88
(Or. Ct. App. 1990) (finding "'expanded criteria" for commitment not violative of equal
protection clause).
128.
This section is adapted from 1 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, supra note 1, §
2C-5.3c.
129.
644 F.2d 147 (3d Cir. 1980), vacated, 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
130. Id. at 164-70.
131.
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 325 (1982).
132.
Id. at 324.
133.
Although the "reasonably nonrestrictive" phraseology continues to be
occasionally cited, its contours have rarely been explored. 2 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY
LAW, supranote 3, § 3A-9.5, at 100 & nn.791-96.
134.
See Goebel v. Colorado Dep't of lasts., 764 P.2d 785, 797, 809 (Colo. 1988),
appeal after remand sub nom. Goebel v. Benton, 830 P.2d 995 (Colo. 1992) (construing
state law to provide treatment rights-including the LRA-for both involuntary and
voluntary patients, but rejecting the plaintiffs Youngberg claims).
The Vermont Supreme Court, citing with approval an earlier decision by the
Washington Supreme Court, set out its scheme by which the statutory criteria could be
satisfied:
[Voluntary alternatives must be considered first. The proposed patient should
be encouraged to submit to an out-patient examination by a psychiatrist of his or
her choice. Failing that, an out-patient examination could be scheduled by the
court with a physician located as near as possible to the proposed patient's home.
Although the latter alternative was unsuccessfully attempted in the present
case, we believe additional options still remain. Among other less restrictive
alternatives are "outreach home-visit evaluations." Under this alternative, the
proposed patient would be visited at home by a psychiatrist for evaluation.
Although this method may not always be practicable or successful, it may be
appropriate in some cases. Another alternative to be considered by the trial
court is the possibility of admitting expert opinion evidence at the commitment
hearing in the absence of a psychiatric report, pursuant to [state statute and
evidence rule].
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The Meaning of Riggins

In 1992, mental disability law jurisprudence seemed to take
a dramatic turn in Riggins v. Nevada."' Riggins held that the use
of antipsychotic drugs violated the defendant's right to a fair trial
(at which he had raised the insanity defense),' focusing on the
drugs' potential side-effects," 7 and construing its previous
decision in Washington v. Harper3 -limiting the rights of
convicted prisoners to refuse medication 1 39-- to require an
"overriding justification and a determination of medical
appropriateness" prior to forcibly administering antipsychotic
medications to a prisoner. 40 Justice Kennedy's concurrence
focused on what might be called the "litigational side-effects" of
antipsychotic drugs, and discussed the possibility that the drug
use might have "compromise [d]" the substance of the defendant's
trial testimony, his interaction with counsel, and his
comprehension of the trial."1
While the court in Riggins did not set out a bright line test
for determining the state's burden in involuntarily medicating a
pretrial detainee at trial,"' it did find that the burden would be
In re W.H., 481 A.2d 22, 25-26 (Vt. 1984) (citations omitted) (citing Mark Platt, Note, The
Due Process of Community Treatment of the Mentally Ill: A Case Study, 59 TEX. L. REV.
1481, 1494 n.71 (1981)).
In North Dakota, the state supreme court has construed the operative statute to
mandate a twofold inquiry: "(1) whether or not a treatment program other than
hospitalization is adequate to meet the individual's treatment needs, and (2) whether or
not an alternative treatment program is sufficient to prevent harm or injuries which an
individual may inflict upon himself or others." In re J.S., 499 N.W.2d 604, 606 (N.D.
1993). In another case, the court held that while "'[financial circumstances may be
relevant to "availability" of an alternative treatment program,'" poverty is not a '"criterion
for commitment,'" and accordingly reversed a commitment order where medical evidence
revealed that, if financial assistance were available, the patient in question could be
suitably treated in a nursing home. In re R.M., 555 N.W.2d 798, 801 (N.D. 1996). For postYoungberg constructions of the least restrictive alternative principle in a civil
commitment context that do not cite Youngberg, see 1 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW,
supra note 1, § 2C-5.3c, at 429 n.908.
135.
504 U.S. 127 (1992). See generally 2 PERLIN, MENTAL DIsABiLITY LAW, supra
note 3, § 3B-8.3.
136.
Riggins, 504 U.S. at 138.
137.
Id. at 137 (noting that the antipsychotic drugs' side effects might have affected
defendant Riggins' demeanor and testimony at trial, which could prejudice the jury's
evaluation of him).
138.
494 U.S. 210 (1990).
139.
Id. at 221-22.
140. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 135. See generally Marybeth Zientek, Note, Riggins v.
Nevada: Medicated Defendants and Courtroom Demeanor from the Jury's Perspective, 30
Am. CRm. L. REV. 215 (1992).
141. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 142 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
142.
See id. at 135-36 (discussing conditions under which the forced administration
of drugs would satisfy due process).
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met if the state proved either of the following: 1) the treatment
was "medically appropriate and, considering less intrusive
alternatives, essential for the sake of Riggins' own safety or the
safety of others,"' or 2) there were no less intrusive means by
which to obtain an adjudication of the defendant's guilt or
innocence.'
Riggins' use of "less intrusive alternatives" language in this
context was especially surprising. As the Supreme Court chose to
bypass this construction in Youngberg v. Romeo,'45 it had
appeared that there was simply no place for this doctrine in
mental disability law. Riggins gave this construct new life in the
surprising context of a criminal case. " 6 Yet, there had been no
indication in the years after Riggins was decided that lower
courts were in any sort of hurry
to revitalize least restrictive
47
alternative law in this context.

G. Perfunctory Involuntary Civil Commitment Hearings"'
Mental disability law is a topic dealt with on a daily basis by
trial courts across the country in a series of unknown cases
involving unknown litigants, where justice is often administered
in assembly-line fashion.14 9 Sophisticated legal arguments are
rarely made, expert witnesses are infrequently called to testify,
and lawyers all too often provide barely-perfunctory
representation.15 ° From this perspective, mental disability law is
often invisible, both to the general public and to the academy.

143.
Id. at 135.
144.
Id.
145.
See 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982) (agreeing that it is not appropriate for the courts to
specify which alternative must be chosen, and that constitutional rights are protected by
the exercise of sound professional judgment).
146.
Perlin, Promises by the Hour, supra note 22, at 972-73 (proposing the
importance of the "least restrictive alternative" concept as developed in Riggins in
evaluating other involuntary treatment issues).
147.
See 2 PERLiN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, supra note 3, § 3B-8.3, at 329 n.1354
(citing cases limiting Riggins).
148.
This section is adapted from Michael L. Perlin, "Half-Wracked PrejudiceLeaped
Forth: Sanism, Pretextuality, and Why and How Mental Disability Law Developed as it
Did, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 3, 19-22 (1999) [hereinafter Perlin, Half-Wracked
Prejudice]. The Supreme Court has noted that the average time for involuntary civil
commitment hearings was 9.2 minutes. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 609 n.17 (1979).
149.
See Developments, supra note 60, at 1265-71 (detailing the typical commitment
procedures followed by state courts).
150.
James A. Holstein, Court-Ordered Incompetence: Conversational Organization
in Involuntary Commitment Hearings, 35 SOC. PROBS. 458, 464 (1988) (discussing the
failure of the public defender system to provide effective defense in mental incompetency
hearings).
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The overwhelming number of cases involving mental
disability law issues are "litigated" (quotation marks are used
intentionally and provocatively) in pitch darkness. Involuntary
civil commitment cases are routinely disposed of in a matter of
minutes in closed courtrooms.1 51 Often, constitutional doctrines
articulated by the Supreme Court in mental disability law cases
are ignored. The Supreme Court has stated, albeit in dicta, that
"many psychiatric predictions of future violent behavior by the
mentally ill are inaccurate."" 2 Yet, such predictions are offeredfrequently in minimalist ways that are subject to no meaningful
cross-examination or challenge-daily in civil commitment courts
across the country.'53
State legislatures craft elaborate commitment codes, often
mandating the need for an "overt act" as a predicate to
commitment."" Yet, the expression of wishes, desires or the
recitation of fantasies has been relied upon as a basis for
commitment in individual cases.' Although the right to counsel
is provided for in virtually every state commitment statute,'5 6
that right is often honored only in the breach; lawyers
representing
patients-and, just
as
important,
those
representing mentally disabled criminal defendants-often
reflect Judge Bazelon's worst nightmare of "walking violations of
' 57
the sixth Amendment.""
In short, the track record of counsel in representing persons
subject to the involuntary civil commitment process-and of
judges in conducting involuntary civil commitment hearingshas not been an inspiring one."5 Counsel's inadequacies make the
151.
See Parham,442 U.S. at 609-10 n.17.
152.
Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 324 (1993).
153.
See, e.g., 1 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABnI
LAW, supranote 1, § 2C-5.2, at 414-15.
154. Id. § 2A-4.5.
155.
See, e.g., People v. Stevens, 761 P.2d 768, 775 & n.12 (Colo. 1988) (relying on
presumed sexually inappropriate dress and manner-posing "provocatively in front of a
mirror in the [hospital] day room in a tight-fitting leotard"-as sufficient evidence of a
patient's danger to self to support his order of commitment); State v. Hass, 566 A.2d 1181,
1182-83 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1988) (holding that a patient's sexual fantasies can
serve as confirmatory evidence supporting his need for treatment under the state's Sex
Offender Act).

156.

See ROBERT M. LEVY & LEONARD S. RUBENSTEIN, THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH

MENTAL DISABILITIES 74 (1996) (stating that courts have almost universally held that
defendants in civil commitment hearings have right to counsel); see generally 1 PERLIN,
MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, supra note 1, § 2B-3.1, at 197-201 (citing cases).
157.
David L. Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 2
(1973). For more recent cases discussing the inadequacy of counsel in the death penalty
context, see Michael L. Perlin, "The Executioner's Face is Always Well-Hidden": The Role
of Counsel and the Courts in Determining Who Dies, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 201, 204-07
(1996).
158.
See generally Michael L. Perlin, FatalAssumption: A CriticalEvaluation of the
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problems that I am addressing here even more difficult to
resolve.
H. The Right to Services in the Community'59
It is now necessary
law-the constitutional
treatment-in an effort
between least restrictive
litigation has taken.

to turn to a mostly-moribund body of
dimensions of a right to community
to determine the connection, if any,
alternative law and the path that this

1. Background. The theoretical underpinnings of a right to
services in the community are found in the early cases that
established both a right to treatment and a right to the least
restrictive alternative in commitment decision making, and
served as the initial groundwork for the attempt to structure a
right to de-institutionalization and to community services.'
Scholars suggested that predischarge planning and development
of aftercare services were specific enforceable aspects of the
constitutional right to treatment,"' and cases proceeded on
several parallel fronts-as outgrowths of right to treatment cases
and challenges to involuntary civil commitment statutes, 2 as
outgrowths of cases seeking to extend the least restrictive
alternative doctrine beyond intrahospital decisionmaking,"6' and
Role of Counsel in Mental Disability Cases, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 39 (1992) (discussing
the inconsistency and inadequacy of counsel provided to defendants in commitment
hearings).
159. This section is adapted from Michael L. Perlin, The Voluntary Delivery of
Mental Health Services in the Community, in LAW, MENTAL HEALTH, AND MENTAL
DISORDER 150, 152-54 (Bruce D. Sales & Daniel W. Shuman eds., 1996) [hereinafter

Perlin, Voluntary Delivery].
160. Michael L. Perlin, Rights ofEx-Patients in the Community: The Next Frontier?,8
BULL. AM. AcAD. PSYcHOL. & L. 33,33 (1980).
161. Saphire, supra note 83, at 266-67 (arguing that the logical extension of a court's
finding of an involuntary committed patient's right to treatment is her right to
appropriate aftercare). For a subsequent, similar formulation, see, for example, Tim
Exworthy, Compulsory Care in the Community: A Review of the Proposalsfor Compulsory
Supervision and Treatment of the Mentally Ill in the Community, 5 CRIM. BEHAV. &
MENTAL HEALTH 218, 237-38 (1995):

If patients are to be obliged to be subject to compulsory orders in the community
as well as in hospital, to suffer further loss of rights, of privacy or to refuse to
consent to treatment, then they are entitled to expect at least a reasonable
standard of care. This places an obligation on authorities to provide that care.
Id.
162. See Nancy Y. Rhoden, The Limits of Liberty: Deinstitutionalization,
Homelessness, and Libertarian Theory, 31 EMORY L.J. 375, 421-22 (1982) (noting that
various right to treatment cases have recognized the need for aftercare services).
163. See id. at 422-24 (arguing that courts have increasingly required consideration
of the least restrictive alternative when adequate community facilities were not
available).
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as discrete cases seeking the promulgation of a discrete
constitutional or statutory right to community care."'
2. The Early Litigation. Early cases thus found that, as
part of the constitutional right to treatment, the state was
obligated to provide "adequate transitional treatment and care
for all patients released after a period of involuntary
confinement."'65 The provision of these services was explicitly
seen
as
a
major
"disincentive
to
unnecessary
institutionalization." 6 ' Another early institutional rights case
found that a settlement that had provided residents with the
"'least restrictive and most normal living conditions possible'
required state officials to fund "natural home placements" for
such residents where it was167needed to meet the settlement's deinstitutionalization criteria.
The first case that focused explicitly on a right to community
treatment found a statutory right to aftercare under local law,
and ordered that the District of Columbia had a specific
affirmative obligation to place those patients suitable for
placement in "less restrictive alternatives" in community
settings. 6 ' Although, operationally, compliance with this court
decree was sporadic, 9 the legal principle was never seriously
164. See Dixon v. Weinberger, 405 F. Supp. 974, 979-80 (D.D.C. 1975) (requiring a
hospital to develop a plan for treatment of plaintiff patients in "suitable residential
facilities under the least restrictive [alternative] conditions"); David Ferleger, AntiInstitutionalizationand the Supreme Court, 14 RUTGERS L.J. 595, 598 & n.12 (1983)
(noting that thousands of institutionalized individuals have used judicial means to secure
more humane services in community facilities); David Ferleger & Penelope A. Boyd, AntiInstitutionalization:The Promise of the Pennhurst Case, 31 STAN. L. REv. 717, 732 (1979)
(stating that "[miuch progress has occurred in vindicating the legal rights of the mentally
ill and mentally retarded").
165.
Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 386 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
166.
Patricia M. Wald & Paul R. Friedman, The Politics of Mental Health Advocacy
in the United States, 1 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 137, 146 (1978).
167.
N.Y. State Ass'n of Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 492 F. Supp. 1099, 1110
(E.D.N.Y. 1980).
168. See Dixon, 405 F. Supp. at 979. See also Melissa G. Warren & Robert R. Moon,
Dixon: In the Absence of PoliticalWill, Carry a Big Stick, 18 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 329,
330 (1994) (noting that Dixon was the first de-institutionalization case to order
community-based treatment).
169.
See 2 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABiLIY LAW (1st ed.), supra note 76, § 7.06;
Landmark Agreement to Create Community Mental Health System, 13 MENTAL &
PHYsIcAL DISABILITY L. REP. 229 (1989); Accord Reached on Community Services Planfor
D.C. Patients, 40 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 973 (1989) (reporting that an
agreement had finally been reached in the landmark Dixon case, thirteen years after the
court's order). The litigation continues to this day. See Dixon v. Barry, 967 F. Supp. 535,
555 (D.D.C. 1997) (appointing a receiver to oversee the Commission on Mental Health
Services after twenty-two years of unsuccessful compliance). See generally Warren &
Moon, supra note 168, at 330 (highlighting the discrepancy and delay between the coures
ruling in Dixon and the implementation of its orders).
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challenged and subsequent cases in other jurisdictions settled on
terms that were close to those ordered in the Dixon decree.17 A
somewhat different approach was put forth in New Jersey, where
the state Supreme Court ruled that individuals who no longer
met involuntary civil commitment criteria, but for whom there
was no adequate or suitable placement, would be entitled to
special placement hearings at which the court would make
inquiry as to "the needs of the individual for custodial and
supportive care, the desires of the individual regarding
placement, the type of facility that would provide the needed
level of care in the least restrictive manner, the availability of
such placement, [and] the efforts of the State to locate such
placement."' 1
Finally, litigation sought the declaration of a constitutional
right to de-institutionalization and community services. Merging
arguments in support of constitutional rights to treatment and
the least restrictive alternative,' 2 this theory argued that, where
further inpatient confinement is "predictably antitherapeutic,
further confinement must be deemed to effect a continuing
violation of due process."'73 When this theory was advanced in the
case of Halderman v. PennhurstState School and Hospital,'4 it
was, at first, remarkably successful. First, the district court
found that conditions at the Pennhurst facility (an institution
that was "inappropriate and inadequate for the habilitation of
the retarded"),' 5 violated residents' rights to minimally adequate
habilitation,' 6 their right to freedom from harm,"' their right to
170.
See, e.g., Wuori v. Zitnay, Civ. No. 75-80-P (D. Me. July, 14 1978); Brewster v.
Dukakis, 544 F. Supp. 1069 (D. Mass. 1982) (mem.), affd as modified, 786 F.2d 16 (1st
Cir. 1986).
171.
In re S.L., 462 A.2d 1252, 1258 (N.J. 1983); Michael L. Perlin, "Discharged
Pending Placement: The Due Process Rights of the Nondangerous Institutionalized
Mentally Handicappedwith "Nowhere to Go," 5 DIREcTIONS IN PSYcHIATRY 1, 2 (1985)
[hereinafter Perlin, Discharged Pending Placement]. On the "discharged pending
placement" (DPP) status (and the successor "conditions extended placing placement"
(CEPP) status) in general, see 1 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILMrrY LAW, supranote 1, § 2C-6.3.
172.
See Ferleger & Boyd, supra note 164, at 739 (arguing that involuntarily
committed patients have a right to habilitation which can never be adequately provided
by mental institutions and that, therefore, the only constitutionally acceptable method of
treatment is that of the least restrictive alternative).
173.
Saphire, supranote 83, at 286 (footnote omitted).
174.
446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1978), affd in part and rev'd in part, 612 F.2d 84
(3d Cir. 1979), rev'd, 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
175.
Id. at 1304.
176. Id. at 1318. Although there are self-evidently great differences between facilities
established to care for persons with mental retardation and those so established for
persons with mental illness, the case law has rarely focused on these differences, and
most important cases have been cited interchangeably in subsequent decisions without
regard to the particular handicapping condition of the institutionalized persons in
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[h]abilitation," 78 as well as state and

federal statutory rights to minimally adequate habilitation,"' and
ordered the facility closed, finding that every resident removed
from the facility had to be "accommodated in a community
facility
which
[would]
provide
minimally
adequate
8
habilitation." '
On appeal, the Third Circuit substantially affirmed, but on a
nearly totally different legal basis, finding that the federal
Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act (DD
Act) provided an enforceable statutory right to treatment in the
least restrictive alternative setting."' On the other hand, it
disagreed with the trial court's conclusion that the facility needed
to be closed, believing that, for some patients, such a transfer to
community settings "might be too unsettling a move," 82 and
ordering a remand for individual determinations as to the
appropriateness of "an improved Pennhurst for each such
patient." 83
Thus, by the early 1980s, it appeared as if the concept of a
right to community services was one in good currency. Courts
appeared willing to premise this right on both constitutional and
statutory bases, and appeared comfortable with seeing it as the
logical next step in right to treatment and right to least
restrictive alternative litigation."M The decisions by the Supreme
Court in Youngberg and in Pennhurst, however, made it clear
that this vision was not shared by that court."
3. The Supreme Court Speaks. The Supreme Court first
heard the state's appeal from the Pennhurst case in 1981.186 Per
Justice Rehnquist, it rejected out of hand the Third Circuit's
methodology, and ruled that the DD Act did not create
enforceable rights.8 7 The Court conceived of the statute as merely
question.
177.
Id. at 1320.
178.
Id. at 1321-22.
179.
Id. at 1322-24.
180.
Id. at 1325, 1327.
181.
Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 612 F.2d 84, 107 (3d Cir. 1979),
rev'd, 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
182.
Id. at 114.
183.
Id.
184.
See Keilitz et al., supra note 77, at 692-93 (describing the use of the "least
restrictive alternative" concept to implement the policy of de-institutionalization of the
mentally retarded); see also Ferleger, supra note 164, at 625 (noting that the right to
habilitation for the mentally retarded has gained statutory and judicial recognition).
185.
Refer to Part II.E supra.
186.
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
187.
Id. at 18, 31-32. In the DD Act, Congress made specific findings that
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a voluntary "federal-state grant program" through which the
federal government could provide financial assistance to states to
aid in the creation of programs to treat developmentally disabled
persons."' The Court further found that nothing in the legislative
history of the Act suggested that Congress intended to require
the states to provide "'appropriate treatment" in the "least
restrictive environment" to mentally retarded citizens.189 It then
remanded the case to the Third Circuit to consider other
arguments that had been made by the plaintiffs upon which the
lower court had not yet ruled.'
On remand, the Third Circuit reinstated in its entirety its
initial ruling, but on an entirely different basis. Premising its
holding solely on Pennsylvania law, the court found that state
residents were entitled to treatment in the least restrictive
alternative setting, and that such a formulation meant "'the
mentally retarded person and [his or her] family shall have the
right to live a life as close as possible to that which is typical for
the general population.' 1 91 Again, state officials appealed this
decision to the Supreme Court.'92
Then, in 1984, the Supreme Court once more reversed the
Third Circuit in Pennhurst on Eleventh Amendment grounds.! 3
"[individuals with developmental disabilities have a right to appropriate treatment,
services, and habilitation" and that treatment should be provided "in the setting that is
least restrictive of the individual's personal liberty." 42 U.S.C. § 6009(1)-(2) (1994 &
Supp. IV 1998).
188. Pennhurst,451 U.S. at 11.
189. Id. at 18.
190. Id. at 31.
191. Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 673 F.2d 647, 652 (3d Cir. 1982),
rev'd, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (quoting In re Schmidt, 429 A.2d 631, 635 (Pa. 1981)).
192. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
193. Id. at 120. The Eleventh Amendment reads, in pertinent part: "Te Judicial
power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another
State ...

."

U.S. CONST. amend. XI.

Decisions construing this amendment have been characterized as "a wonderland
of judicially created and perpetuated fiction and paradox." Spicer v. Hilton, 618 F.2d 232,
235 (3d Cir. 1980). See generally Martin A. Schwartz, The Eleventh Amendment and State
Law Claims, 18 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 151, 151-52 (1984) (summarizing the Court's
reasoning in the second Pennhurstcase).
Pennhurst continues to be cited and analyzed regularly by commentators. See,
e.g., J. Brian King, The State PoliticalProcesses Theory of the 11th Amendment, 19 REV.
LrITG. 355, 395 (2000); Roger C. Hartley, The Alden Trilogy: Praiseand Protest, 23 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POLY 323, 377-92 (2000); James E. Pfander, Once More Unto the Breach:
Eleventh Amendment Scholarshipand the Court, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 817, 825 (2000).

The Supreme Court has since granted certiorari in (and in late October 2000,
heard oral argument in) Garrett v. University of Alabama at Birmingham Board of
Trustees, 193 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 1999) (states do not have Eleventh Amendment
sovereign immunity in ADA cases), cert. granted in part, 120 S.Ct. 1669 (2000). For a

20001

PROMISES OFPARADISE

1027

In what was "clearly the Court's most bitterly split institutional
decision of the century,"194 the Court ruled that such actions were
entirely barred by the Eleventh Amendment,19 5 and that a federal
court's instructing state officials how to conform their conduct to
comply with state law was an "intrusion on state sovereignty"
that conflicted squarely with "principles of federalism." 9' 6
These cases reflect a Supreme Court vision of the state's
obligation to provide services for persons with mental disabilities
that is drastically at odds with the one offered by advocates
representing such persons. While the persons with mental
disabilities at risk in Pennhurst and Youngberg may not have
been the Court's specific targets in its decisions, the cases are
clearly linked to the Court's desire "to ban 'public law' litigation
in general, and 'institutional' litigation in particular, from federal
tribunals,"'97 as well as its ongoing transformation of the Court's
role "from the guardian of individual rights to the guardian of
majority rule."'98 Within months of the second Pennhurst
decision, commentators had thus gloomily concluded that the
Court's opinion had "distressing tactical implications for
proponents of a right to community treatment for mental
patients,"'99 and predicted that the case would foreclose further
federal
involvement
in institutional
reform
and
deinstitutionalization litigation."9
And so it appeared, at least until the passage of the
Americans with Disabilities Act.

discussion of the oral argument in Garrett,see Tony Mauro, High Court Weighs Whether
ADA Applies to States, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 12, 2000, at 1, availableat WL 10/12/2000 NYLU 1.
194. See 2 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILTY LAW (1st ed.), supra note 76, § 7.15, at 627;
David Rudenstine, Pennhurst and the Scope of Federal Judicial Power to Reform Social
Institutions,6 CARDOzO L. REV. 71, 72 (1984).
195. Pennhurst,465 U.S. at 120.
196. Id. at 106.
197. George D. Brown, Beyond Pennhurst-ProtectiveJurisdiction, the Eleventh
Amendment, and the Power of Congress to EnlargeFederalJurisdictionin Response to the
BurgerCourt, 71 VA. L. REV. 343, 344 (1985) (footnotes omitted).
198. Suzanna Sherry, Issue Manipulation by the Burger Court: Saving the
Community from Itself, 70 MINN. L. REV. 611, 663 (1986).
199. Geoffrey Mort, Note, Establishing a Right to Shelter for the Homeless, 50
BROOy. L. REV. 939, 954 (1984).
200. Elizabeth M. Pezzetti, Comment, Reinstitutionalization of the Mentally
Retarded, 32 WAYNE L. REV. 1105, 1108 (1986).
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III. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 201
A. The Statute
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) has been hailed
by advocates for persons with disabilities as "a breathtaking
promise ,,212 "the most important civil rights act passed since
1964, " 203 and as the "'Emancipation Proclamation for those with
disabilities.'2 -4 It is, without question, Congress's most
innovative attempt to address the pervasive problem of
discrimination against physically and mentally handicapped
citizens2 5' by providing, in the words of a congressional
committee, "a clear and comprehensive national mandate to end
discrimination against individuals with disabilities." 6 The ADA
provides basically the same bundle of protections for persons
with disabilities as the Civil Rights Acts of the 1960s did for
citizens of color 0 7 with clear, strong, and enforceable standards. 8
The language that Congress chose to use in its introductory
fact-findings is of extraordinary importance.2

9

1

Its specific finding

201. This section is adapted from MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE:
MENTAL DISABILITY ON TRIAL 175-204 (2000) [hereinafter PERLIN, THE HIDDEN
PREJUDICE]. See generally Michael L. Perlin, The ADA and Persons with Mental
Disabilities:Can Sanist Attitudes be Undone?, 8 J.L. & HEALTH 15 (1993-94) [hereinafter
Perlin, Sanist Attitudes]; PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW (Cum. Supp. 1999), supra note
29, § 6.44A, at 16-83; Perlin, Promisesby the Hour,supranote 22; Perlin, Maggie'sFarm,
supranote 29; Perlin, Misdemeanor Outlaw, supranote 96.
202. Bonnie Milstein et al., The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Breathtaking
Promisefor People with Mental Disabilities,24 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1240 (1991).

203. Kent Jenkins, Jr., Spotlight Finds Hayer, WASH. POST, May 28, 1990, at D1,
cited in Kimberly A. Ackourey, Comment, InsuringAmericans with Disabilities:How Far
Can Congressgo to ProtectTraditionalPractices?,40 EMORY L.J. 1183, 1183 & n.1 (1991).
204. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990: Summary and Analysis, 4 Lab. Rel.
Wk. (BNA) 29, Special Supplement, at S-5 (July 18, 1990), cited in Ackourey, supra note
203, at 1183 & n.2 (statement by the Bill's sponsors). See also, e.g., Sandra K. Law,
Comment, The Americans with DisabilitiesAct of 1990: Burden on Business or Dignity for
the Disabled?, 30 DuQ. L. REV. 99, 114 (1991) (concluding that the ADA is a "solid and
positive step toward making this country a better nation").
205. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW (Cum. Supp. 1999), supra note 29, § 6.44A, at
16 (proclaiming that the ADA stands as Congress's "most innovative attempt to address
the pervasive problem of discrimination against physically and mentally handicapped
citizens").
206. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485 (I1), at 23 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 44546.

207. For a comprehensive overview, see Bonnie P. Tucker, The Americans with
DisabilitiesAct of 1990: An Overview, 22 N.M. L. REV. 13 (1992).
208. See, e.g., id. at 43-48, 63-64, 93-95, 101-02 (discussing enforcement
provisions). Cf Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities,Discrimination,and
ReasonableAccommodation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1, 2-3 (1996) (reading the ADA to prbvide more
protections than do other civil rights acts).
209. On the "shocking and eye-opening" nature of these findings, see Amy Scott
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that individuals with disabilities are a "discrete and insular
minority... subjected to a history of purposeful unequal
treatment, and relegated
to a position of political
powerlessness "210 is not just precatory flag-and-apple-pie
rhetoric.2 1' This language-granted "the force of law"' 2-was
carefully chosen; it comes from the heralded "footnote 4" of
United States v. Carolene Products, which has served as the
springboard for nearly a half century of challenges to state and
municipal laws that have operated in discriminatory ways
against other minorities," 3 and reflects a congressional
commitment to provide "protected class" status for persons with
disabilities." 4 This in turn forces courts to employ a "compelling
Loundes, Note, The Americans with DisabilitiesAct of 1990:A CongressionalMandatefor
HeightenedJudicialProtectionof DisabledPersons,44 FLA. L. REV. 417, 446 (1992).
210.
42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (1994).
211.
Cf Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 11 (1981) (stating
that the rights language in the DD Act and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6010-6081
(1994 & Supp. 11 1998 & Supp. IV 1999), simply created a "federal-state" granting
statute, and did not vest individuals with developmental disabilities with a legally
enforceable cause of action). Refer to notes 193-200 supra and accompanying text. This
conclusion was criticized as "absurd" and "objectionable" in an article co-authored by
plaintiffs' lead counsel in the Pennhurst case. David A. Ferleger & Patrice Maguire Scott,
Rights and Dignity: Congress, the Supreme Court, and People with Disabilities After
Pennhurst, 5 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 327, 350 (1983). On the question of whether key
sections of the ADA will be seen as little more than hortatory language, see Perlin,
Promises by the Hour, supra note 22, at 955. For a survey of all commentary, see 2
PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAw (1st ed.), supra note 76, § 7.13.
212. James B. Miller, The Disabled, the ADA, and Strict Scrutiny, 6 ST. THOMAS L.
REV. 393, 413 (1994).
213.
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). I discuss
the impact of this footnote on the development of mental disability law in Michael L.
Perlin, On "Sanism,"46 SMU L. REv. 373, 380-81 & n.51 (1992) [hereinafter Perlin, On
"Sanism"], and in 1 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, supra note 1, § 1-2.1, at 7 & n.31.
On the significance of the Carolene Products language to the ADA, see, for
example, Leonard S. Rubenstein, Ending Discrimination Against Mental Health
Treatment in Publicly Financed Health Care, 40 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 315, 339 (1996)
(explaining that the ADA's invocation of the Carolene Products footnote demonstrates
justification for employing "heightened judicial scrutiny"); Susan Lee, Heller v. Doe:
Involuntary Civil Commitment and the "Objective"Languageof Probability,20 AM. J.L. &
MED. 457, 467-68 n.90 (1994) (noting that the language of the ADA reflects congressional
intent to identify persons with disabilities as a group "deserving heightened scrutiny");
Lisa A. Montanaro, Comment, The Americans with DisabilitiesAct: Will the Court Get the
Hint? Congress' Attempt to Raise the Status of Persons with Disabilities in Equal
Protection Cases, 15 PACE L. REV. 621, 663 (1995) (observing that by adopting the ADA,
Congress attempted to utilize the Carolene Products theory to imply that a "heightened
level of scrutiny" should be used in ADA cases).
214.
See, e.g., Montanaro, supra note 213, at 663-64 (proclaiming that Congress
intended to transform persons with disabilities into a suspect class for purposes of
constitutional and statutory interpretation); Loundes, supra note 209, at 446 ("Congress
clearly intended to create a new protected class-the disabled."); Miller, supra note 212,
at 412 (declaring that Congress applied a "suspect class" test in ADA statutory
language); Phyllis Coleman & Ronald A. Shellow, Ask About Conduct, Not Mental Illness:
A Proposal for Bar Examiners and Medical Boards to Comply with the ADA and
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state interest" or "strict scrutiny" test in considering statutory
and regulatory
challenges
to
allegedly discriminatory
treatment.15 In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,16
the Supreme Court ruled that persons with mental retardation
were neither a suspect class nor a quasi-suspect class for
purposes of equal protection analysis.2 17 In supporting its
conclusion, the Court noted that a contrary decision would have
made it difficult to distinguish other groups such as persons with
mental illness "who have perhaps immutable disabilities setting
them off from others, who cannot themselves mandate the
desired legislative responses, and who can claim some degree of
prejudice from at least part of the public at large."21 The law's
invocation of the full "sweep of congressional authority, including
the power to enforce the fourteenth amendment""9 simply means
that any violation of the ADA must be read in the same light as a
violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution,
guaranteeing-for the first time-that this core constitutional
protection will finally be made available to persons with
disabilities.

Constitution, 20 J. LEGIS. 147, 151 n.23 (1994) (stating "the ADA treats disabled persons
as a suspect class").
In a trilogy of employment cases, the Supreme Court has narrowed the category
of persons who are to be treated as "disabled" under the ADA. See Sutton v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 475 (1999) (concluding that the determination of disability
under the ADA should be made with reference to measures mitigating the impairment,
including, in this instance, corrective lenses); Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S.
555, 558 (1999) (finding that the ADA does not require an employer to "justify enforcing
[an otherwise applicable federal safety] regulation solely because its standard may be
waived in an individual case"); Murphy v. UPS, Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 518-19 (1999)
(upholding a Tenth Circuit decision to consider the petitioner in his medicated state when
deciding that his hypertension did not "substantially limit" a major life activity). Nothing
in these decisions, however, goes to the question of how the Court would construe
discrimination cases involving individuals found to be "disabled" within the ADA's
meaning.
215.
On the relationship between this language and the heightened scrutiny
requirement, see, for example, Crowder v. Kitagawa, 842 F. Supp. 1257, 1264 (D. Haw.
1994) (assuming an application of strict scrutiny in ADA cases) and William Christian,
Note, Normalization as a Goal: The Americans with DisabilitiesAct and Individualswith
Mental Retardation, 73 TEX. L. REV. 409, 424 (1994) (contending that laws affecting
persons with disabilities should be subject to heightened scrutiny).
216.
473 U.S. 432 (1985).
217.
Id. at 435.
218. Id. at 445.
219.
42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4) (1994).
220.
See, e.g., Timothy M. Cook, The Americans with DisabilitiesAct: The Move to
Integration, 64 TEMP. L. REv. 393, 434 (1991) ("[Congressional] findings indicate
unambiguously that Congress considered disability classifications to be just as serious
and just as impermissible as racial categorizations that are given 'strict' or 'heightened'
scrutiny, sustainable by the courts only if they are tailored to serve a 'compelling'
governmental interest."). Cook's article is cited approvingly in, inter alia, Muller v.
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Individuals in in-patient psychiatric hospitals comprise a
population that is classically voiceless and friendless, with few
contacts in the "free world."22 1 It is a population whose
disenfranchisement starkly mirrors the sort of powerlessness and
marginalization spoken to by the Supreme Court in Carolene
Products and, of course, spoken to by Congress in the ADA's
initial findings section."
The legislative history is remarkably skimpy, and speaks to
only two relevant considerations. First, it reflects congressional
awareness of the pernicious danger of stereotyping behavior. It
makes this clear through its heavy reliance on the Supreme
Court's language in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline223
that "society's accumulated myths and fears about disability and
disease are as handicapping as are the physical limitations that
flow from actual impairment."" 4 Congress stressed that its
including in the definition of disability an individual who is
regarded as being impaired2 " acknowledges this teaching about
the power of myths.226
Thus, employment decisions cannot be based on
"paternalistic views" of what is best for a person with a
disability. 27 The employment title of the ADA was thus designed,
in significant part, to prevent employers from relying on
presumptions, stereotypes, misconceptions and unfounded fears
in making employment decisions," and as a means of breaking
the chain of misperception that disabled individuals are a

Costello, 187 F.3d 298, 308 (2d Cir. 1999); Kathleen S. v. Department of Public Welfare, 10
F. Supp. 2d 460, 467 (E.D. Pa. 1998); Muller v. Hotsy Corp., 917 F. Supp. 1389, 1402 (N.D.
Iowa 1996); Valentine v. American Home Shield Corp., 939 F. Supp. 1376, 1388 (N.D.
Iowa 1996); Fink v. Kitzman, 881 F. Supp. 1347, 1368 (N.D. Iowa 1995); Hutchinson v.
UPS, Inc., 883 F. Supp. 379, 387 (N.D. Iowa 1995); and HeatherK v. City of Mallard, 887
F. Supp. 1249, 1263 (N.D. Iowa 1995).
221.
See, e.g., Curran, supra note 62, at 274-77 (providing an historical background
on the institutionalization of mentally ill persons in the United States).
222.
Rubenstein, supra note 213, at 338-39, 350.
223.
480 U.S. 273, 277 (1987) (finding that an individual with tuberculosis is a
"handicapped individual" under 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973)).
224. Id. at 284.
225.
42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C) (1994).
226.
H.R. REP. No. 101-485 (II), at 53 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303,
335; see also id. at 55, reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 337.
227. Id. at 74, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 356.
228.
Id. at 30, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.K.N. 303, 311 (stating that discrimination
against persons with disabilities "often results from false presumptions, generalizations,
misperceptions, patronizing attitudes, ignorance, irrational fears, and pernicious
mythologies").
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"permanently helpless and separate
class, unable to work or
229
otherwise contribute to society."
Second, the history of the "direct threat" section-again
relying on Arline-specifies that, for persons with mental
disabilities, the employer must identify "the specific behavior on
the part of the individual that would pose the anticipated direct
threat," and that the determination must be based on such
behavior, "not merely on generalizations about the disability."" °
In such a case, there must be "objective evidence... that the
person has a recent history of committing overt acts or making
threats which caused harm or which directly threatened harm.""'
Persons with mental disabilities have faced the brunt of
discrimination for years. Surveys show that mental disabilities
are the most negatively perceived of all disabilities. 2 Mentally
229.
Elizabeth Clark Morin, Note, Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990: Social
Integration Through Employment, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 189, 189, 212 (1990). See also
Peter David Blanck, Empirical Study of the Employment Provisions of the Americans with
DisabilitiesAct: Methods, PreliminaryFindings, and Implications, 22 N.M. L. REV. 119,
129 (1992) (describing employers' myths in this context). See generally Peter David
Blanck, The Emerging Work Force:Empirical Study of the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 16 J. CORP. L. 693, 696 (1991) (providing empirical data on employment-related
aspects of the ADA); W. Robert Gray, The Essential-FunctionLimitation of the Civil
Rights of People with Disabilitiesand John Rawls's Concept of Social Justice, 22 N.M. L.
REV. 295, 317 (1992) (discussing the significance of " misinformed stereotypes'").
230.
H.R. REP. No. 101-485 (II), at 56-57 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303,
338-39. See also PERLIN, THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE, supra note 201, at 178 n.31 ('The
determination that an individual with a disability will pose a safety threat to others must
be made on a case-by-case basis and must not be based on generalizations,
misperceptions, ignorance, irrational fears, patronizing attitudes, or pernicious
mythologies') (quoting Cheryl Fells, Employee Benefit Plan Implications of the Americans
with DisabilitiesAct, in Employer Compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990, at 414 (PLI Corp. Practice Course Handbook Series No. B4-6947, 1990)); Ren~e L.
Cyr, Note, The Americans with DisabilitiesAct: Implications for Job Reassignment and
the Treatment of Hypersusceptible Employees, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 1237, 1273 (1992)
(quoting H.R. REP. No. 101-485 (II) for the proposition that generalized fear about risks
from the employment environment "'cannot be used by an employer to disqualify a person
with a disability").
231.
H.R. REP. No. 101-485 (i), at 45-46 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
445, 468-69. This language closely parallels that of the Fair Housing Act Amendments of
1988, under which an otherwise qualified disabled person can be excluded from the
definition of handicap only where a landlord can establish that the individual's tenancy
would be a "direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals." 42 U.S.C. §
3604(e)(9) (1994). To trigger this section, the legislative history stressed that "there must
be objective evidence from the person's prior behavior that the person has committed
overt acts which caused harm or which directly threatened harm." H.R. REP. No. 100-711,
at 29 (1988), reprintedin 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2190. See Richard B. Simring, Note,
The Impact of Federal Antidiscrimination Laws on Housing for People with Mental
Disabilities,59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 413, 441 (1991) (pointing to the legislative history of
the ADA showing Congress anticipated this proof would have to overcome a plaintiffs
prima facie case establishing there existed a reasonable accommodation the landlord had
not provided).
232.
Jane West, The Social and Policy Context of the Act, in THE AMERICANS WITH
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disabled individuals have been denied jobs, refused access to
apartments in public housing or entry to places in public
accommodation, and turned down for participation in publiclyfunded programs because they appear "'strange'" or "different.'" 3
A series of behavioral myths has emerged suggesting that
mentally disabled persons are deviant, worth less than "normal"
individuals, disproportionately dangerous, and presumptively
incompetent.234 Yet, the ADA barely speaks directly to these
myths or to the special problems faced by persons with mental
disabilities in attempting to combat them."
Although a smattering of early ADA case law dealt with
issues involving institutional settings and mental disability,"5 all
prior developments must be seen as a prelude to the Court's
decision in Olmstead.
7
B. Olmstead v. L.C.2

In Olmstead, the Court qualifiedly affirmed a decision by the
Eleventh Circuit that had provided the first coherent answer to
the question of the right of institutionalized persons with mental
DISABILITIES ACT: FROM POLICY TO PRACTICE 3, 9 (Jane West ed., 1991), reprinted in 69
MILLBANK Q. 3 (1991) (citing AJ. ARANGIO, BEHIND THE STIGMA OF EPILEPSY: AN
INQUIRY INTO THE CENTURIES-OLD DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PERSONS WITH EPILEPSY
(1979)).
233.
Simring, supra note 231, at 422. See also Cook, supranote 220, at 399-414, 424
(recounting the history of government-imposed segregation and degradation of persons
with disabilities). Particularly cruel examples are listed in Tucker, supra note 207, at 1617.
234. See, e.g., Perlin, On "Sanism," supra note 213, at 393-97 (citing, inter alia,
SANDER L. GILmAN, DIFFERENCE AND PATHOLOGY STEREOTYPES OF SEXUALITY, RACE,
AND MADNESS (1985); Steven J. Schwartz, Damage Actions as a Strategy for Enhancing
the Quality of Careof Persons with Mental Disabilities,17 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE
651, 681 (1989-90); Michael L. Perlin, Unpacking the Myths: The Symbolism Mythology of
Insanity Defense Jurisprudence,40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 599, 693-96 (1989-90); Linda A.
Teplin, The Criminality of the Mentally Ill: A Dangerous Misconception, 142 Aivi. J.
PSYCHIATRY 593, 597-98 (1985); and Thomas Grisso & Paul S. Appelbaum, Mentally Ill
and Non-Mentally-ll Patients'Abilities to Understand Informed Consent Disclosuresfor
Medication, 15 LAW & HUMI. BEHAV. 377, 385-86 (1991)).
235.
On the way that public perceptions of mental illness and the accompanying
stigma perpetuate inadequate treatment of the mentally ill, see generally Wayne Edward
Ramage, The PariahPatient:The Lack of Funding for Mental Health Care, 45 VAND.L.
REV. 951 (1992).
236.
See Perlin, THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE, supra note 201, at 188 (discussing, inter
alia, the meaning of Helen L. v. DiDaro, 46 F.3d 325, 331 (3d Cir. 1995)). On the
significance of PennsylvaniaDepartmentof Correctionsv. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 213 (1998)
(applying the ADA to state prisons), see Michael L. Perlin, Hidden Agendas and Ripple
Effects: Implications of FourRecent Supreme Court Decisions for ForensicPsychiatrists,2
J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. PRAC. 33 (2000) [hereinafter Perlin, HiddenAgendas].
237.
527 U.S. 581 (1999). This section is adapted from PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY
LAW (Cum. Supp. 1999), supra note 29, § 6.44AA. See also Perlin, Misdemeanor Outlaw,
supra note 96.
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disabilities to community services under the ADA.238 There, the
Court of Appeals had found that the ADA entitled plaintiffsresidents of Georgia Regional Hospital-to treatment in an
integrated community setting as opposed to an "unnecessarily
segregated" 239 state hospital.
Plaintiffs L.C. and E.W. challenged their placement at
Georgia Regional Hospital, arguing that Title II of the ADA
entitled them to "the most integrated setting appropriate to
[their] needs."24 Although both plaintiffs were transferred to
community settings prior to the court's decision, the court
declined to find the case moot as such cases were "'capable of
repetition, yet evading review.' 24 ' The district court had granted
summary judgment to the plaintiffs, finding that the state's
failure to place them in an "appropriate community-based
treatment program" violated the ADA, 22 and the state appealed.
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the judgment that the
state had discriminated against the plaintiffs, but also remanded
for further findings related to the state's defense that the relief
sought by the plaintiffs would "'fundamentally alter the nature of
the service, program, or activity.'243 On appeal, the Supreme
Court, in a split opinion per Justice Ginsburg,244 qualifiedly
affirmed.245 After setting out the provisions of the ADA that
focused on the institutional segregation and isolation of persons
with disabilities, and the discrimination faced by persons with
disabilities (including "'exclusion ... [and] segregation'), 246 the
Court reviewed key Department of Justice regulations, including
the "'integration regulation,"'247 pointing out that the case, as

238.
L.C. v. Olmstead, 138 F.3d 893 (11th Cir. 1998), affd in part, vacated in part
and remanded, 527 U.S. 581, 587 (1999).
239.
Id. at 897.
240.
Id. at 895-96.
241.
Id. at 895 n.2. (citing, inter alia,Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 318-25 (1988)).
242. Id. at 895.
243.
Id. (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7)).
244.
Justices O'Connor, Breyer, and Souter joined Justice Ginsburg in most of her
opinion. Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 587 (1999). Justice Stevens, who would have
preferred to simply affirm the Eleventh Circuifs opinion, joined with these four justices in
all of the opinion save the portion that outlined the State's obligations in such cases. Id. at
607-08 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice Kennedy
filed a concurring opinion, joined in part by Justice Breyer. Id. at 608 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment). Justice Thomas dissented for himself, the Chief Justice, and
Justice Scalia. Id. at 615 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
245.
Id. at 587.
246. Id. at 588-89 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 121101(a)(2), (3), (5)).
247.
Id. at 592 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (1998)).
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presented, did not challenge their legitimacy.248 The Court then
set out its holding:
We affirm the Court of Appeals' decision in substantial
part. Unjustified isolation, we hold, is properly regarded as
discrimination based on disability. But we recognize, as
well, the States' need to maintain a range of facilities for
the care and treatment of persons with diverse mental
disabilities, and the States' obligation to administer
services with an even hand. Accordingly, we further hold
that the Court of Appeals' remand instruction was unduly
restrictive. In evaluating a State's fundamental-alteration
defense, the District Court must consider, in view of the
resources available to the State, not only the cost of
providing community-based care to the litigants, but also
the range of services the State provides others with mental
disabilities, and the State's obligation to mete out those
services equitably.249
The Court endorsed the Department of Justice's position
that "undue institutionalization qualifies as discrimination 'by
reason of... disability,' 25 and then characterized the ADA as
having "stepped up earlier measures to secure opportunities for
people with developmental disabilities to enjoy the benefits of
community living,"251 stressing how much more comprehensive
the ADA was than had been "aspirational" or "'hortatory" laws
such as the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of
Rights Act. 2 The Court then focused on what it saw as
congressional judgment supporting the finding that "unjustified
institutional isolation of persons with disabilities is a form of
discrimination":
First, institutional placement of persons who can handle
and benefit from community settings perpetuates
unwarranted assumptions that persons so isolated are
incapable or unworthy of participating in community life.
Cf Allen v. Wright ("There can be no doubt that
[stigmatizing injury often caused by racial discrimination]
is one of the most serious consequences of discriminatory
government action."); Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power
v. Manhart, ("'In forbidding employers to discriminate
against individuals because of their sex, Congress intended
to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of

248.
249.
250.
251.
252.

Id. at 592.
Id. at 597.
Id. at 597-98.
Id. at 599.
Id.; see also 2 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW (1st ed.), supranote 76, § 7.13.
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men and women resulting from sex stereotypes."') Second,
confinement in an institution severely diminishes the
everyday life activities of individuals, including family
relations, social contacts, work options, economic
independence, educational advancement, and cultural
enrichment. Dissimilar treatment correspondingly exists in
this key respect: In order to receive needed medical
services, persons with mental disabilities must, because of
those disabilities, relinquish participation in community life
they could enjoy given reasonable accommodations, while
persons without mental disabilities can receive the medical
services they need without similar sacrifice.5 3
The majority immediately clarified some qualifications in its
opinion. It emphasized that the ADA did not "condone[]
termination of institutional settings for persons unable to handle
or benefit from community settings," 4 that the states "generally
may rely on the reasonable assessments of its own professionals
in determining whether an individual" is eligible for communitybased programs," and that there was no requirement that
"community-based treatment be imposed on patients who do not
desire it.""5 None of these issues, however, were present in the
case before it: Georgia's professionals determined that
community-based treatment would be appropriate for the
plaintiffs, both of whom desired such treatment."7 The Court
added one additional word of caution here:
We do not in this opinion hold that the ADA imposes on the
States a "standard of care" for whatever medical services
they render, or that the ADA requires States to "provide a
certain level of benefits to individuals with disabilities." We
do hold, however, that States must adhere to the ADA's
nondiscrimination requirement with regard to the services
they in fact provide.2 8
The Court then turned to the questions of remedy and
enforcement. 59 It rejected the Eleventh Circuit's construction of
the "reasonable-modifications regulation" as "unacceptable" in
that "it would leave the State virtually defenseless" if the
253.
Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 600-01 (citations omitted).
254. Id. at 601-02.
255.
Id. at 602.
256.
Id.
257.
Id. at 602-03.
258.
Id. at 603 n.14 (citations omitted).
259. Although this section of the opinion was co-signed by only four Justices
(Ginsburg, Souter, Breyer, and O'Connor), a reading of it in tandem with Justice
Kennedy's concurrence, id. at 608-15 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment), makes it
likely that it will be treated by lower courts as having the weight of a majority opinion.
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plaintiff demonstrates she is qualified for the program or
placement she seeks. 2" Rather, it concluded:
Sensibly construed, the fundamental-alteration component
of the reasonable-modifications regulation would allow the
State to show that, in the allocation of available resources,
immediate relief for the plaintiffs would be inequitable,
given the responsibility the State has undertaken for the
care and treatment of a large and diverse population of
persons with mental disabilities.26 '
The ADA, it concluded, "is not reasonably read to impel
States to phase out institutions, placing patients in need of close
care at risk," nor is the law's mission "to drive States to move
institutionalized patients into an inappropriate setting, such as a
homeless shelter.",6 2 For other patients, "no placement outside
the institution may ever be appropriate." 6' Because of these
factors, Justice Ginsburg concluded that the state must have
more leeway than offered by the Eleventh Circuit's remedy:
If, for example, the State were to demonstrate that it had a
comprehensive, effectively working plan for placing
qualified persons with mental disabilities in less restrictive
settings, and a waiting list that moved at a reasonable pace
not controlled by the State's endeavors to keep its
institutions fully populated, the reasonable-modifications
standard would be met.2
She summarized in this way:
[U]nder Title II of the ADA, States are required to provide
community-based treatment for persons with mental
disabilities when the State's treatment professionals
determine that such placement is appropriate, the affected
persons do not oppose such treatment, and the placement
can be reasonably accommodated, taking into account the
resources available to the State and the needs of others
with mental disabilities.2 65

260.
Id. at 603.
261.
Id. at 604.
262.
Id. at 604-05. At one point, Georgia had proposed such a placement for one of
the named plaintiffs, and then later retracted it. Id. at 593.
263.
Id. at 605. On this point, the opinion cited, inter alia, Justice Blackmun's
concurrence in Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 327 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring):
"For many mentally retarded people, the difference between the capacity to do things for
themselves within an institution and total dependence on the institution for all of their
needs is as much liberty as they ever will know." See also Olmstead,527 U.S. at 605.
264.
Olmstead,527 U.S. at 605-06.
265.
Id. at 607.
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Justice Stevens concurred, stating that he would have
preferred simply affirming the Eleventh Circuit's opinion, but
because there were not five votes for that disposition, he joined in
all of Justice Ginsburg's opinion, except for the remedyenforcement portion.266 Justice Kennedy concurred, urging
"caution and circumspection" in the enforcement of the Olmstead
case.267 After stressing that "persons with mental disabilities
have been subject to historic mistreatment, indifference, and
hostility,"68 he traced what he saw as the history of deinstitutionalization: that, while it "has permitted a substantial
number of mentally disabled persons to receive needed treatment
with greater freedom and dignity," it "has its dark side" as well.269
Here he quoted extensively from the writings of E. Fuller Torrey:
"For a substantial minority... de-institutionalization has
been a psychiatric Titanic. Their lives are virtually devoid
of 'dignity' or 'integrity of body, mind, and spirit.' 'Selfdetermination' often means merely that the person has a
choice of soup kitchens. The 'least restrictive setting'
frequently turns out to be a cardboard box, a jail cell, or a
terror-filled existence plagued by both real and imaginary
enemies."270
It would be a "tragic event," Justice Kennedy warned, if
states read the ADA-as construed in Olmstead-in such a way
as to create an incentive for states, "for fear of litigation, to drive
those in need of medical care and treatment out of appropriate
care and into settings with too little assistance and
supervision,"271 and he thus emphasized that "opinion[s] of a
responsible treating physician" should "be given the greatest of
deference." 272 He underscored what he saw as a "common

phenomenon":
It is a common phenomenon that a patient functions well
with medication, yet, because of the mental illness itself,
lacks the discipline or capacity to follow the regime the
medication requires. This is illustrative of the factors a
responsible physician will consider in recommending the
appropriate setting or facility for treatment. 211
266.
Id. at 607-08 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
267. Id. at 610 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
268. Id. at 608 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
269.
Id. at 609 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
270.
Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting E. FULLER TORREY, OUT
OF THE SHADOWS: CONFRONTING AMERICA'S MENTAL ILLNESS CRISIS 11 (1997)).
271.
Id. at 610 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
272. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
273.
Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
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Because of these concerns-and his fear that "States may be
pressured into attempting compliance on the cheap, placing
marginal patients into integrated settings devoid of the services
and attention necessary for their condition"-Justice Kennedy
again urged "caution and circumspection" and "great deference to
the medical decisions of the responsible, treating physicians." 4
He continued2 5 by articulating what he saw as the necessary
elements of a discrimination finding,"6 and then raised
federalism concerns: "Grave constitutional concerns are raised
when a federal court is given the authority to review the State's
choices in basic matters such as establishing or declining to
establish new programs. It is not reasonable to read the ADA to
permit court intervention in these decisions."2 '
Finally, he parted company from Justice Ginsburg on the
weight she gave to the congressional findings. The findings in
question, he concluded, "do not show that segregation and
institutionalization are always discriminatory or that segregation
or institutionalization are, by their nature, forms of prohibited
discrimination."278 Instead, he reasoned, "they underscore
Congress' concern that discrimination has been a frequent and
pervasive problem in institutional settings and policies and its
concern that segregating disabled persons from others can be
discriminatory."" 9
Justice Thomas dissented, criticizing the majority opinion
for its interpreting "'discrimination" as encompassing "disparate
treatment among members of the same protected class,"28O
arguing that the congressional findings on which the majority
premised its conclusions were "vague" and "written in general
hortatory terms,"281 that its approach imposed "significant

274. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
275.
Justice Breyer joined in the prior portion of Justice Kennedy's concurrence, but
not in the portion discussed infra at text accompanying notes 276-79. Olmstead, 527 U.S.
at 608 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
276.
Justice Kennedy stated:
If they could show that persons needing psychiatric or other medical services to
treat a mental disability are subject to a more onerous condition than are
persons eligible for other existing state medical services, and if removal of the
condition would not be a fundamental alteration of a program or require the
creation of a new one, then the beginnings of a discrimination case would be

established.
Id. at 612 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
277.
Id. at 612-13 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
278.
Id. at 614 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
279.
Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
280.
Id. at 615-16 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
281.
Id. at 620-21 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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federalism costs," 28 2 and warning that states "will now be forced

to defend themselves in federal court every time resources
prevent the immediate placement of a qualified individual."283 He
concluded: "Continued institutional treatment of persons who,
though now deemed treatable in a community placement, must
wait their turn for placement does not establish that the denial of
community placement occurred 'by reason of their disability.
Rather, it establishes no more than the fact that petitioners have
limited resources."2 '
Olmstead is significant for several reasons. First, it is the
first time that the Supreme Court has ruled on the applicability
of the ADA to community-based treatment programs.8 5 Second, it
breathes important life into the congressional findings on
questions of institutional segregation, discrimination and
exclusion. 286 Third, it specifically focuses on the way that

"[u]njustified isolation... is properly regarded as discrimination
based on disability."27 Fourth, it comprehends how, in its own
words, the ADA had "stepped up" prior congressional efforts in
28
this area..
Fifth, it underscores how institutional isolation
"perpetuates unwarranted assumptions that persons so isolated
are incapable or unworthy of participating in community life,"288
and how such isolation "severely diminishes the everyday life
activities

of [institutionalized]

individuals." 28

And, for the

purposes of this Article, most important, it endorses a least
restrictive
alternative mode of analysis in a civil institutional
29
case.

1

On the other hand, the Court's "qualifiers" are equally
important. The Court sanctions reliance on state professionals in
282.
Id. at 624 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
283.
Id. at 625 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
284. Id. at 626 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
285.
Id. at 607 (concluding that the ADA requires states to provide community-based
treatment for persons with disabilities when the "placement is appropriate, the affected
persons do not oppose such treatment, and the placement can be reasonably
accommodated").
286. Id. at 600 (noting congressional findings that society has historically
discriminated against persons with disabilities and has attempted to isolate and
segregate them).
287.
Id. at 597.
288. Id. at 599 (declaring that the ADA built upon previous legislation to enable
persons with developmental disabilities to benefit from community living).
289.
Id. at 600.
290. Id. at 601.
291.
Id. at 602, 605-06 (declaring that a state may place persons with mental
disabilities in a less restrictive setting if the state provides both substantive safeguards in
the form of opinions from treatment professionals and procedural safeguards in the form
of a waiting list to move people into community settings).
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determining community-treatment eligibility, thus, implicitly,
endorsing a perpetuation of Youngberg v. Romeo's "substantial
professional judgment" standard, 92 notwithstanding the fact that
the Court had stressed that there was no constitutional issue
presented in the case.293 It emphasizes that Olmstead cannot be
read as an opinion designed to "phase out" institutions or to move
patients to inappropriate community settings. 294 And its
"reasonable modifications" formula-by which a state must be
able "to demonstrate that it had a comprehensive, effectively
working plan for placing qualified persons with mental
disabilities in less restrictive settings '21--provides an early
partial blueprint for the resolution of similar future litigation.
Justice Kennedy's concurrence may turn out to be of critical
importance for several reasons. First, he focuses squarely on the
specter of inappropriate de-institutionalization, relying on Fuller
Torrey's powerful critique.295 Second, he raises the concern that
the fear of litigation may lead the state to prematurely and
inappropriately release patients "with too little assistance and
supervision." 97 Finally, he links institutional release with
patients' subsequent failure to self-medicate in community
settings, 23 an argument that resonates in the current debate over
involuntary outpatient commitment laws that premise
community treatment on medication compliance. 9 9 It can be
292. Id. at 602.
293.
Id. at 588.
294. Id. at 604-05.
295.
Id. at 605-06.
296.
Id. at 609 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). In my mind, Torrey's
critique is a terribly flawed
one. See Michael L. Perlin, Competency,
Deinstitutionalization,and Homelessness: A Story of Marginalization,28 HoUS. L. REV.
63, 87, 89, 95-96 (1991) [hereinafter Perlin, Competency] (arguing that social structures
exist to transition patients from an institutional setting into the community and to create
treatment programs that may ultimately be more effective than institutionalized
treatment settings); Michael L. Perlin et al., Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Civil
Rights of Institutionalized Mentally Disabled Persons: Hopeless Oxymoron or Path to
Redemption? 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POLY & L. 80, 118 (1995) [hereinafter Perlin et al.,
Therapeutic Jurisprudence] (rejecting Torrey's premise that patients' rights lawyers
impede the advancement of mental disability law).
297. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 610 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). On the
impact of "litigaphobia" (fear of litigation) on mental disability law jurisprudence, see, for
example, Michael L. Perlin, Tarasoff and the Dilemma of the Dangerous Patient:New
Directionsfor the 1990's, 16 LAw & PSYCHOL. REV. 29, 61-62 (1992) (noting that mental
health professionals are faced with an increased threat of litigation stemming from
Tarasoffliability).
298.
Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 610 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment)
(speculating that if states are "pressured" into discharging patients from institutional
settings, it is possible that some of the discharged patients will fail to comply with the
requirements of their medication).
299.
See 1 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, supranote 1, § 2C-7.3.
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expected that these arguments of Justice Kennedy's will be as
much a factor in the subsequent debate on community treatment
questions as will Justice Ginsburg's majority opinion.
C. Olmstead and the LRA
Olmstead's explicit endorsement of a "least restrictive
setting" principle in institutionalization/de-institutionalization
cases requires a reconceptualization of some of the basic
elements of mental disability law. First, the scope of involuntary
civil commitment and periodic review hearings must be expanded
so as to consider-as an element of the commitment process-an
inquiry into the restrictivity of commitment. At such hearings,
evidence of the impact of institutional segregation and the
availability of community alternatives must be admissible. With
this, of course, will inevitably come an expanded role of counsel
(and, in some cases, experts) in helping the court craft orders
that meet the requirements of Olmstead. Perhaps additional
witnesses will need to be made available to testify as to
comparative restrictivity of community settings, to the
availability of such settings, and, in some cases, to the
300
methodology used by the state in maintaining a "waiting list."
Periodic review hearings, especially, will have to refocus on the
suitability and availability of LRA placements. 0 1
Second, the meaning of "restrictivity of confinement" will
need to be recalibrated. Will community settings always be less
restrictive than institutional settings? Among competing
community settings, how will most/least restrictive be defined or
determined? 32 To what extent will these be objective
determinations (based on some standardized criteria of
300.
Refer to notes 318-22 infra and accompanying text (discussing the need to place
persons with disabilities in the most appropriate setting, with procedural safeguards in
effect to ensure that those placed in group settings will have a mechanism to be de-

institutionalized).
301.
On periodic review in general, see 1 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAv, supra
note 1, at § 2C-6.5c.
302. The same dilemma is present in assessing the comparative restrictivity of
antipsychotic medications, seclusion and restraints. Professor George Dix, for example,
assumes that forced medication is more intrusive than seclusion or restraint. George E.
Dix, Legal and Ethical Issues in the Treatment and Handling of Violent Behavior, in
CLINICAL TREATmENT OF THE VIOLENT PERSON 178, 191 (Loren H. Roth ed., 1987).
Arizona state policies categorize emergency medication as less restrictive than seclusion.
David B. Wexler, Seclusion and Restraint:Lessons from Law, Psychiatry, and Psychology,
5 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 285, 288 (1982). Dr. Paul Soloff agrees. Id. (referring to Paul
H. Soloff, Physical Controls: The Use of Seclusion and Restraint in Modern Psychiatric
Practice, in CLINICAL TREATMENT, supra, at 123). New Hampshire guidelines rate
seclusion as less restrictive than physical restraints, which are, in turn, less restrictive
than drugs. Wexler, supra, at 288.
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"restrictivity") or subjective (primarily taking into account the
patient's perspective). Just as Professor Bruce Winick created a
"continuum of 'intrusiv[ity]' in his analysis of the right to refuse
treatment,3 3 so must a "continuum of restrictivity" be created to
guide decisionmaking here.
Third, Justice Kennedy-by adopting E. Fuller Torrey's deinstitutionalization critique in his Olmstead concurrence3 0 -- has
issued a challenge to those who believe that Justice Ginsburg's
majority opinion sets out an appropriate course of behavior in deinstitutionalization cases. It is essential that his opinion be
challenged-both in the courts and in the analytical and
empirical literature-lest Torrey's florid and hyperbolic cant set
the tone for the subsequent debate.
Fourth, the extent to which the "substantial professional
judgment" language of Youngberg v. Romeo.. will be engrafted
into the analysis of post-Olmstead de-institutionalization cases is
far from clear. Olmstead counsels great deference to the decisions
made by institutional professionals;0 . yet, tellingly, the
Youngberg standard is never explicitly endorsed. If there is a
lacuna between Youngberg and Olmstead on this question,
careful exploration of this apparent gap in reasoning is essential.
Fifth, Olmstead should encourage patient advocates to
resuscitate the path of litigation that died in the wake of the
Supreme Court's second PennhurstState School decision to force
states to create community alternatives. This is clearly beyond
the scope of the Olmstead opinion; Justice Ginsburg specifies
that there was no constitutional issue presented to the Court in
that case. 0 ' Yet, I believe that the attention that must now be
focused at the commitment/periodic review hearing on
restrictivity of conditions will reinvigorate this debate and will,
303.
BRUCE J. WINICK, THE RIGHT TO REFUSE MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT 23 (1997)
(proposing a function that links a treatment method to its associated intrusiveness factor,
whereby constitutional protection of the patient is triggered when the level of
intrusiveness exceeds a given threshold).
304.
Refer to text accompanying note 270 supra.
305.
For my earlier critique of Torrey's writings, see Perlin et al., Therapeutic
Jurisprudence,supranote 296, at 118.
306.
457 U.S. 307, 323 (1982) (declaring that treatment decisions by professionals
are presumed valid and that "liability may be imposed only when the decision by the
professional is such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment... as to
demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a
judgment").
307. See Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 602 (1999) ("The State generally may rely
on the reasonable assessments of its own professionals in determining whether an
individual 'meets the essential eligibility requirements' for habilitation in a communitybased program.").
308.
Id. at 588.
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ultimately, augur a return to the sort of creative litigational
efforts not seen in this area for more than fifteen years.
Sixth, Olmstead requires us to rethink the trend towards
outpatient commitment, as reflected in such legislation as New
York's "Kendra's Law."" 9 Outpatient commitment laws began as
a means of expanding less restrictive options for inpatients; over
the years, they have been transmuted into vehicles for the
exertion of greater social control over individuals not in inpatient psychiatric hospitals.31 Olmstead forces us to reexamine
this change of direction, and may also-eventually-force us to
confront the role of forced medication in the out-patient clinic
enterprise. 1 '
Finally, Olmstead will require that states-such as New
Jersey-that currently employ categories such as "discharged
pending placement" or "commitment extended pending
placement" 12 to abandon (or, at least, radically restructure) these
categories if they lead to lengthier (and more restrictive) periods
of in-patient institutionalization for those who can, in Justice
Ginsburg's phrase, "handle and benefit from community
settings.""' It is not unreasonable to expect the development of a
new body of case law on this precise question.
Olmstead may affect implementation of the LRA in other,
subtler ways. Some revolve around the use of antipsychotic
drugs. Evidence suggests that such medications are used less
frequently in group homes and other community living
arrangements than in larger institutional settings."4 Since
309.
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 9.48, 9.60 (McKinney Supp. 2000) (providing
standing for a class of people to seek a court order requiring the severely mentally ill to
obtain assisted outpatient treatment).
310.
See 1 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, supra note 1, § 2C-7.3.
311.
See id. § 2C-7.3, at 497-98 (quoting Susan Stefan, Preventive Commitment: The
Concept and its Pitfalls, 11 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 288, 294 (1987)
(declaring that medication is the "core of outpatient treatment"), Steven J. Schwartz &
Cathy E. Costanzo, Compelling Treatment in the Community: Distorted Doctrines and
Violated Values, 20 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1329, 1368 (1987) (stating that outpatient
commitment is "synonymous with forced medications")).
312.
See 1 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, supra note 1, § 2C-6.3. Refer to text
accompanying note 171 supra.
313.
Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 600.
314. See, e.g., Scott Spreat & James Conroy, Use of Psychotropic Medications for
Personswith Mental RetardationWho Live in Oklahoma Nursing Homes, 49 PSYCHIATRIC
SERVICES 510, 512 (1998) (describing a study that found that mentally retarded
individuals in group homes are given antipsychotic medication less frequently than those
in nursing homes); Maura Lerner & Joe Rigert, Minnesota Now Has Low Rate of
Medicating the Mentally Retarded, MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL STAR TRIB. July 2, 1989,
available at 1989 WL 3728068 (reporting that 16% of the patients with mental
retardation in group homes were given tranquilizers as compared to 26% of those in
larger institutions).
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Rennie v. Klein abandoned the least restrictive alternative in a
drug refusal case in the aftermath of Youngberg v. Romeo,315 few
cases have explored the relationship between the LRA and the
right to refuse medication.316 Olmstead's invocation of "least
restrictive settings" language may once again lead courts to
consider the relationship between drugging policies and
restrictivity of confinement. 17
In the aftermath of Olmstead, patient advocates quickly
focused on implementation issues. Steven Gold,31 for example,
has asked: "What state has any plan, let alone one that is either
'comprehensive' or 'effectively working' to move people out of
nursing homes or other institutions? Remember, the state's plan
must positively show how, who, when, etc. people will be moved
out of institutions." 1 9
Similarly, Timothy Westmoreland and Thomas Perez,
officials with the U.S. Health Care Financing Administration,
have urged in a letter to all state Medicaid directors, that states
"[d]evelop a comprehensive, effectively working plan.., to
strengthen community service systems and serve people with
disabilities in the most integrated setting appropriate to their
needs."32 They focused not only on the adequacy of
implementation plans but, strikingly, on the involvement of
persons with disabilities in the creation of these plans.3 ' Added
315.
Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266, 269, 270 (3d Cir. 1983) (rejecting the "least
intrusive means" concept in light of Youngberg).
316.
But see State v. Nording, 485 N.W.2d 781, 787 (N.D. 1992) ('This new
legislation is designed to safeguard a patient's right to be free of forced medication unless
the prescribed medication is necessary to effectively treat the patient, unless the
medication is the least restrictive form of intervention available for the patient's
treatment, and unless the benefits of the medication outweigh its known risks to the
patient.").
317.
Beyond the scope of this article is a consideration of the use of the newer,
atypical antipsychotic drugs such as clozapine in this context. See, e.g., Douglas Mossman,
M.D. & Douglas S. Lehrer, M.D., Conventional and Atypical Antipsychotics, Novel Agents,
and the Evolving Standardof Care,51 PSYCIATRIC SERVICES 1528 (forthcoming) (2000).
318.
Gold is a prominent Pennsylvania disabilities rights attorney. See, e.g., Adapt of
Phila. v. Phila. Hous. Auth., No. Civ. A. 98-4609, 2000 WL 433976, at *1, *10-11 (E.D. Pa.
Apr. 14, 2000) (requiring the state of Pennsylvania to make at least 5% of public housing
units accessible to people with mobility impairments); Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325,
327 (3d Cir. 1995) (voiding a Pennsylvania law that required a patient to receive statesponsored care in a nursing home rather than in his or her own home).
319.
Steve Gold et al., Summary of Supreme Court's Decision in Olmstead v. L.C. &
E.W.: Some Preliminary Thoughts, INCITEMENT (ADAPT, Austin, TX), Spring-Summer
1999, at 10-11.
320.
Timothy M. Westmoreland & Thomas Perez, SMD Letter-Guidance on
Olmstead Decision and Fact Sheet-1114100, http://www.hcfa.gov/medicaid/
smdll40a.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2000).
321.
See id. ("The Department [of Health and Human Services] believes that
comprehensive, effectively working plans are best achieved with the active involvement of
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Gold: "Reasonable pace should be determined by organizations of
people with disabilities. One test of 'reasonableness' should be
how long your Governor would want to stay, unnecessarily and
unjustified, in an institution or nursing home.""
In short, Olmstead offers a redemptive promise to persons
with disabilities, especially to persons who are institutionalized
and who can "handle" community placements. The next question
to which I will turn is this: Can Olmstead stem the tide of sanism
and pretextuality that engulfs the mental disability law system?
IV. SANISM, PRETEXTUALITY AND THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE

Earlier, I alluded to the impact of sanism and pretextuality
on developments in this area. What do I mean by these terms?
Simply put, "sanism" is an irrational prejudice of the same
quality and character of other irrational prejudices that cause,
and are reflected in, prevailing social attitudes of racism, sexism,
homophobia and ethnic bigotry."
It infects both our
jurisprudence and our lawyering practices.324 Sanism is largely
invisible and largely socially acceptable. It is based
predominantly upon stereotype, myth, superstition and deindividualization, and is sustained and perpetuated by our use of
alleged "ordinary common sense" (OCS) and heuristic reasoning
in an unconscious response to events both in everyday life and in
the legal process.32

individuals with disabilities and their representatives in design, development and
implementation."); Gold et al., supra note 319 ("We believe that states must, using
organizations of people with disabilities such as ADAPT, centers for independent living,
self-advocacy organizations, and psychiatric survivor groups identify all people who wish
to leave institutions. Not a single state is doing that today.").
322. Gold et al., supra note 319.
323. Perlin, Half-Wracked Prejudice, supra note 148, at 4. The classic treatment is
found in GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 107-25, 372-77 (1954) (noting

that the facts we have about group differences largely fail to account for our prejudices).
For an important new, and different, perspective, see ELISABETH YOUNG-BRUEHL, THE
ANATOmY OF PREJUDICES (1996). See generally PERLIN, THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE, supra

note 201, at ch. 2 (discussing roots of sanism and the relationship between sanism and
other "ismic" behavior, such as racism or sexism or homophobia).
324. The phrase "sanism" was, to the best of my knowledge, coined by Dr. Morton
Birnbaum. See Morton Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment: Some Comments on its
Development, in MEDICAL, MORAL AND LEGAL ISSUES IN HEALTH CARE 97, 106-07 (Frank

Ayd, Jr. ed., 1974.) See also Koe v. Califano, 573 F.2d 761, 764 (2d Cir. 1978) (noting that
it may be difficult to find attorneys who will represent "these unfortunate people," either
because there is little hope of recouping a fee or because of a discriminatory attitude,
perhaps unconscious, against the mentally ill); Perlin, Competency, supra note 296, at 9293.
325.
See generally MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INSANITY
DEFENSE (1994).
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"Pretextuality" means that courts accept (either implicitly or
explicitly) testimonial dishonesty and engage similarly in
dishonest (frequently meretricious) decisionmaking, specifically
where witnesses, especially expert witnesses, show a "high
propensity to purposely distort their testimony in order to
achieve desired ends." 26 This pretextuality is poisonous; it infects
all participants in the judicial system, breeds cynicism and
disrespect for the law, demeans participants, and reinforces
shoddy lawyering, blase judging, and, at times, perjurious and/or
corrupt testifying.
In a series of recent articles and a new book (The Hidden
Prejudice: Mental Disability on Trial), I have sought to
demonstrate that mental disability law is sanist and pretextual,
no matter whether the topic in question is involuntary civil
commitment law, institutional rights law, the right to sexual
interaction, the insanity defense, competency to plead guilty or
waive counsel, or the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.3 27 The
question can thus be posed in this manner: Does Olmstead stand
alone as an outlier in defiance of this sorry record?
"Therapeutic jurisprudence" studies the role of the law as a
therapeutic agent, recognizing that substantive rules, legal
procedures and lawyers' roles may have either therapeutic or
326.
Charles M. Sevilla, The Exclusionary Rule and Police Perjuy, 11 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 839, 840 (1974); Michael L. Perlin, Morality and Pretextuality, Psychiatry and Law:
Of 'Ordinary Common Sense," Heuristic Reasoning, and Cognitive Dissonance, 19 BULL.
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 131, 133 (1991).
327. See generally PERLIN, THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE, supra note 201, at 200-04
(discussing sanism and the Americans with Disabilities Act); Perlin, Half-Wracked
Prejudice,supra note 148, at 3-5, 28-36 (introducing several papers in a symposium, and
concluding that mental disability law "is irrational and incoherent, and this irrationality
and incoherence disables civil commitment law, institutional treatment law, civil rights
law, and criminal procedure law"); Perlin et al., Therapeutic Jurisprudence,supra note
296, at 81-83 (discussing sanism and pretextuality); Michael L. Perlin & Deborah A.
Dorfman, Is It More Than "Dodging Lions and Wastin' Time"? Adequacy of Counsel,
Questions of Competence, and the Judicial Process in Individual Right to Refuse
Treatment Cases, 2 PSYCHOL. PUB. PoL'Y & L. 114, 116-17, 130 (1996) (discussing the
adequacy of counsel and a person with mental disability's right to refuse treatment);
Michael L. Perlin, Decoding Right to Refuse Treatment Law, 16 INTL J.L. & PSYcHIATRY
151, 170-75 (1993) (discussing the legal regulation of mental health practice and "the
right to refuse antipsychotic medication"); Michael L. Perlin, Hospitalized Patients and
the Right to Sexual Interaction: Beyond the Last Frontier?, 20 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 517, 519, 535-40 (1993-94) (discussing "the right of institutionalized persons
with mental disabilities to engage in consensual sexual activity"); Michael L. Perlin,
"Dignity was the First to Leave": Godinez v. Moran, Colin Ferguson, and the Trial of
Mentally Disabled Criminal Defendants, 14 BEHAv. SCI. & L. 61, 64-65, 75-80 (1996)
(discussing the arrest and trial of Colin Ferguson in the context of Godinez v. Moran, 362
U.S. 402 (1960), and the public attitude toward Ferguson's trial); Michael L. Perlin & Keri
K. Gould, Rashomon and the CriminalLaw: Mental Disability and the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 22 AM. J. CRIi. L. 431, 435-36, 442-46 (1995) (discussing the application of
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to mentally disabled persons).
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antitherapeutic consequences, and questioning whether such
rules, procedures and roles can or should be reshaped so as to
enhance their therapeutic potential, while not subordinating due
process principles."' Recent therapeutic jurisprudence articles
and essays have thus considered such matters as the insanity
acquittee conditional release hearing, health care of mentally
disabled prisoners, the psychotherapist-patient privilege,
incompetency labeling, competency decision-making, juror
decision-making in malpractice and negligent release litigation,
competency to consent to treatment, competency to seek
voluntary treatment, standards of psychotherapeutic tort
liability, the effect of guilty pleas in sex offender cases,
correctional law, health care delivery, "repressed memory"
litigation, the impact of scientific discovery on substantive
criminal law doctrine, and the competency to be executed.2 9 I
have weighed the therapeutic jurisprudence implications of much
of mental disability law33 and, again, in the final section of this
paper, will consider those implications for the question I am here
addressing.
V. SANISM, PRETEXTUALITY, THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE,
OLMSTEAD AND THE LRA
I have written extensively about the sanist and pretextual
bases of all mental disability law, including those aspects that
are most relevant to this inquiry-involuntary civil commitment
law, right to treatment law, and right to community treatment
law.33' I believe that the majority opinion in Olmstead is the

328.
See PERLIN, THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE, supra note 201, at 261-310; id. at 261 n.1
(citing, inter alia, DAVID B. WEXLER, THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A
THERAPEUTIC AGENT (1990); DAVID B. WEXLER & BRUCE J. WINICK, ESSAYS IN
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (1991); DAVID B. WEXLER & BRUCE J. WINICK, LAW IN A
THERAPEUTIC KEY: DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (1996); BRUCE J.
WINICK, THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE APPLIED: ESSAYS ON MENTAL HEALTH LAW (1997);

David B. Wexler, Putting Mental Health into Mental Health Law: Therapeutic
Jurisprudence,16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 27 (1992); David B. Wexer, Applying the Law
Therapeutically,5 APP'L. & PREVEN. PSYCHOL. 179 (1996); David B. Wexler, Reflections on
the Scope of TherapeuticJurisprudence,1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POLY & L. 220 (1995); 1 PERLIN,
MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, supra note 1, § 2D-3; Bibliography of Therapeutic
Jurisprudence,10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUI. RTS. 915 (1993)).
329.
See, e.g., 1 PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, supra note 1, § 2D-3, at 535-40

nn.83-132 (citing articles).
330.
See, e.g., PERLIN, THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE, supranote 201, at 273-303.
331.
See id. at 79-125; Perlin, Maggie's Farm, supra note 29; Perlin, Voluntary
Delivery, supra note 159; Perlin, Sanist Attitudes, supra note 201; Perlin, Hidden
Agendas, supra note 236. See generally Michael L. Perlin, Therapeutic Jurisprudence:
Understandingthe Sanist and PretextualBases of Mental DisabilityLaw, 20 NEW ENG. J.
CRIi. & CIv. CONFINEMENT 369 (1994) [hereinafter Perlin, Sanist and PretextualBases].
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Supreme Court's most important majority non-sanist decision in
332
the nearly a quarter of a century since O'Connorv. Donaldson.
In two recent articles, I discussed in an exploratory manner
Olmstead's potential for combating sanism and pretextuality in
mental disability law in general, 3 and in the forensic mental
health process in particular.3 34 Here I want to turn to those
aspects of mental disability law that are most closely related to
LRA inquiries.
First, Olmstead has the capacity to transform involuntary
civil commitment and periodic review hearings from their current
often-feeble state of perfunctory lip service into vigorous and
authentic inquiries into restrictivity of confinement and the
availability of community treatment. These hearings have
traditionally been pretextua1335 and sanist,336 and Olmstead offers
the first glimmer of hope in years that such hearings-if they are
transformed in appropriate cases into vehicles that genuinely
and thoughtfully consider restrictivity of confinement and
availability of community placements and treatment-will
provide authentic due process. As I have argued elsewhere, the
provision of37such due process is mental disability law at its most
therapeutic.
This will not happen, of course, unless counsel takes the
lead. The inadequacy of lawyering in the involuntary civil
commitment process is well-known;... its perpetuation-to which
courts, legislatures and bar associations have been willfully blind
for years-has been sanist and pretextual. Unless there is a
profound shift in the attitudes of counsel (and in the attitudes of
judges who assign counsel), Olmstead is in danger of being little
more than another "paper victory"339 for persons with mental
disabilities.
332. 422 U.S. 563, 575-76 (1975) (establishing a right to liberty for nondangerous
persons with mental illness).
333.
Perlin, Maggie's Farm, supranote 29.
334. Perlin, MisdemeanorOutlaw, supra note 96.
335.
See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, Pretexts and Mental Disability Law: The Case of
Competency, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 625, 636-39 (1993).
336.
See, e.g., Perlin, On "Sanism,"supranote 213, at 400-04 (noting that "[ciriminal
trial process case law is riddled with sanist stereotypes and myths").
337. See Perlin et al., Therapeutic Jurisprudence, supra note 296; PERLIN, THE
HIDDEN PREJUDICE, supra note 201, at 112. On the relationship between "procedural
justice" and the involuntary civil commitment process, see Tom R. Tyler, The
Psychological Consequences of Judicial Procedures: Implications for Civil Commitment
Hearings, 46 SMU L. REv. 433, 442-44 (1992). See also Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic
Jurisprudenceand the Civil Commitment Hearing,10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 37, 3844 (1999).
338.
See Perlin, Voluntary Delivery, supra note 159, at 151.
339.
I use this phrase in an ADA context in Perlin, Sanist Attitudes, supra note 201,
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Creation of the "discharged pending placement" status 30
flowed from what were therapeutic motivations-the desire to
transform involuntary civil commitment hearings into placement
hearings for persons no longer dangerous but with "nowhere to
go."34' In the intervening years since the New Jersey Supreme
Court created this category in In re S.L.,"4 it is clear that this
status has been used in significantly anti-therapeutic ways. 3
Olmstead offers the potential of reversing this anti-therapeutic
trend. Similarly, the use of outpatient commitment status has
shifted from a means of allowing certain patients more freedom
to a way of insuring more state control over those not
institutionalized
(supported
by
the
threat
of
institutionalization).'4 4 Olmstead-if taken seriously-forces a
reconsideration of this "'widening the net,""45 and, perhaps, offers
an opportunity for outpatient commitment to, once again, be a
therapeutic, and not an anti-therapeutic tool.
Justice Ginsburg's language about isolation and segregation
in Olmstead may also lead to a revival of interest in
constitutionally-based right-to-community services litigation. In
an earlier article, I severely criticized the Supreme Court's
Pennhurstdecisions with these words:
The Court's decisions are profoundly antitherapeutic. Their
failure to find a generic constitutional right to community
services curbed litigation seeking to establish such a right.
The initial Pennhurst decision, for all practical purposes,
eviscerated the DD Act as a potential litigational tool for
institutionalized persons with mental disabilities; the
reaffirmation of the no-general-right-to-community-services
at 22-23 (relying on Michael S. Lottman, Paper Victories and Hard Realities, in PAPER
VICTORIEs AND HARD REALITIES: THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LEGAL AND
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY DISABLED 93 (Valerie Bradley & Gary Clarke
eds., 1976)).
340.
Refer to note 312 supra and accompanying text (discussing "discharged pending
placement" classifications).
341.
Perlin, DischargedPendingPlacement,supra note 171.
342.
462 A.2d 1252, 1253 (N.J. 1983) (explaining that patients classified as
"discharged pending placement" are technically discharged, but that they remain in
mental hospitals until appropriate outside placements become available).
343.
See, e.g., In re Commitment of G.G., 640 A-2d 1156, 1158-59 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1994); In re Commitment of Raymond S., 623 A.2d 249, 250, 252 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1993).
344.
E.g., Michael L. Perlin, "Outpatient Commitment: Historical Perspectives,
Political Slogans, and Civil Libertarian Dilemmas" (paper presented to 25th Congress,
International Academy of Law and Mental Health, Siena, Italy, July 2000); Michael L.
Perlin, "Outpatient Commitment: Political Panacea or Pandora's Box?" (paper presented
to NY State Office of Court Administration Legal Update Program, Saratoga Springs, NY,
January 2000).
345.
Perlin, Sanist and Pretextual Bases, supra note 331, at 375.
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in Youngberg ended most advocacy efforts to have such a
right established. The second Pennhurst opinion effectively
put an end to de-institutionalization/aftercare litigation as
a strategy of patients' rights advocates.3 46
Only Olmstead offers the possibility of litigational
redemption.
Olmstead has the potential to be the Supreme Court's most
therapeutic decision since Jackson v. Indiana's recognition that
the "nature and duration" of civil commitments were
constitutionally bound to each other.3 11 We have known-for
decades-that community treatment "works" better, that there is
less improper use of antipsychotic medication in community
settings, that community patients are less stigmatized, and stand
a better chance of authentic reintegration into all aspects of
social, economic and personal life.348
On the other hand, Justice Kennedy's concurrence raises
troubling
questions
from a therapeutic
jurisprudence
perspective-by the use of the de-institutionalization-aspsychiatric-Titanic metaphor, 49 by his demonstration of
"Iitigaphobia," 350 and by his linkage of institutional release with
failure to self-medicate in community settings. 5 1 It is essential
that other academics and behavioral scholars turn their attention
to these allegations, if Olmstead is truly to have a therapeutic
impact on the mental disability law system.
VI. CONCLUSION

Lessard v. Schmidt's integration of the LRA principles into
an involuntary civil commitment challenge refocused mental
disability law in the early 1970s.352 Youngberg v. Romeo's failure

346.
Perlin, Voluntary Delivery, supranote 159, at 165 (essay published in 1996).
347.
406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972).
348.
See Jennifer Gutterman, Note, Waging a War on Drugs:Administering a Lethal
Dose to Kendra's Law, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 2401, 2407-08 (2000) (noting that forty-one
states currently have outpatient commitment statutes); Judi Clements, Funding Care in
the Community, THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 8, 1999, 1999 WL 5104980 (stating that research
"shows a steady 3 per cent annual decline in the proportion of homicides committed by
people with mental disorders and suggests that public fear has been fuelled by selective
reporting in the media").
349.
Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 608-10 (1999) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment).
350.
See id. at 610 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); Stanley Brodsky, Fear
of Litigation in Mental Health Professionals, 15 CIm. JusT. & BEHAV. 492, 497 (1988)
(illustrating that the disproportionate reactions of mental health professionals to the
threat of suit have reached phobic proportions).
351.
See Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 610 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
352.
Refer to Part H.D supra.
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to employ these principles in an institutional rights case confused
matters in the early 1990s." 3 Riggins v. Nevada's re-discovery of
the LRA principle in a right to refuse treatment/fair trial case
renewed interest in this aspect of mental disability law in the
early 1990s. 3 54 And Olmstead v. L.C.'s endorsement of the
principle in a community treatment case promised new life for
mental disability law in the early 2000s.
Olmstead's incorporation of the LRA principles-in a
decision laden with language about "unnecessary isolation,"
"institutional segregation," and "erroneous" perceptions of
persons with disabilities-may promise a new era in mental
disability law. For the first time, a majority of the Supreme
Court acknowledged the corrosive and debilitating effects of
improper institutionalization.3 5 5 For the first time, a majority of
the Supreme Court acknowledged that such institutionalization
"severely diminishes the everyday life activities of individuals,
including family relations, social contacts, work options,
economic independence, educational advancement, and cultural
enrichment."35 And, for the first time, the Supreme Court
analogizes the corrosive impact of stereotypical perceptions-the
heart of sanist attitudes-in cases involving race and sex to a
case involving persons with mental disabilities.3" 7
As I have already argued, Olmstead's potential impact
extends far beyond the relatively narrow statutory question
directly before the Supreme Court in that case. It forces us to
reconsider the scope of involuntary civil commitment and
periodic review hearings, the use of hybrid categories such as
DPP/CEPP,3 58 and the expanded reliance on OPC, and may well
serve as a "shot in the arm" to mostly-moribund constitutionally-

353.
Refer to Part II.E supra.
354. Refer to Part IIF supra.
355.
Cf City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 462 (1985) (Marshall,
J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (individuals with mental
disabilities have been subject to "[a] regime of state-mandated segregation and
degradation.. . that in its virulence and bigotry rivaled, and indeed paralleled, the worst
excesses of Jim Crow").
356.
Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 601 (citing Brief for American Psychiatric Association et
al. as Amici Curiae, 20-22).
357.
Id. at 600-01 (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755 (1984) ("There can be no
doubt that [stigmatizing injury often caused by racial discrimination] is one of the most
serious consequences of discriminatory government action."); Los Angeles Dep't of Water
& Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978) ('In forbidding employers to
discriminate against individuals because of their sex, Congress intended to strike at the
entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex
stereotypes.'")) (alterations in original).
358.
Refer to note 171 supra.
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based community treatment litigation.151 It also "ups the ante" for
lawyers representing persons with mental disabilities subject to
institutionalization and those who are eligible for release.3 6 ° At
the same time, as I have argued, the concerns raised in Justice
Kennedy's separate opinion, however, must be carefully dealt
with. To be charitable, Justice Thomas's concerns in dissentthat states "will now be forced to defend themselves in federal
court every time resources prevent the immediate placement of a
qualified individual"3'-are just plain silly,362 and require no
response save an observation that such an opinion reflects the
degree to which Justice Thomas is out of touch with counsel's
pathetic record in providing legal services to persons with mental

disabilities. 3
Since Olmstead was decided, there has been surprisingly
little follow-up litigation. In the year since Olmstead was
decided, there have been remarkably few cases relying upon it.
Lower federal courts and state courts have cited Olmstead for the
proposition that "the ADA in fact prohibits segregation of persons
with disabilities and requires states to make reasonable efforts to
place institutionalized individuals with disabilities into the
community"364 in the "most integrated setting to fit their needs, " 35
359.
Refer to notes 285-95 supra and accompanying text (describing the significance
of the Olmstead decision).
360.
Refer to Part 1I.C supra (discussing Olmstead and the least restrictive
alternative).
361.
Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 625 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
362.
I was grateful to learn-after the fact-that I was not the first to apply this
adjective to an opinion written by Justice Thomas. See Girardeau A. Spann, Color-Coded
Standing, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 1422, 1466 (1995) (discussing Justice Thomas's opinion in
Northeastern FloridaChapterof the Associated General Contractorsof America v. City of
Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656 (1993): 'Moreover, Justice Thomas's proffered distinction of
Warth seems more silly than serious."). See also Susan R. Klein, The Discriminatory
Application of Substantive Due Process:A Tale of Two Vehicles, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 453,
463 n.54 (1997) ("At least Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas have
remained relatively consistent in adhering to historical practices in forfeiture cases, no
matter how outdated and silly these practices have become.").
363.
See 1 PERLIN, MENTAL DIsABiLrrY LAW, supra note 1, § 2B-2, at 192 ("The
record of the legal profession in providing meaningful advocacy services to persons with
mental disabilities has been grossly inadequate.").
364.
Rolland v. Cellucci, 191 F.R.D. 3, 9 (D. Mass. 2000).
365.
Kathleen S. v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, No. CIV A 97-6610, 1999 WL 1257284, at
*5 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 23, 1999). The Supreme Court of Indiana recently observed:
Since the 1970s, Indiana law has strongly reflected policies to de-institutionalize
people with disabilities and integrate them into the least restrictive
environment.... National policy changes have led the way for some of Indiana's
enactments in that several federal acts either guarantee the civil rights of people
with disabilities or condition state aid upon state compliance with desegregation
and integrationist practices.
Creasy v. Rusk, 730 N.E.2d 659, 664-66 (Ind.2000) (citing, interalia, Olmstead) (footnote
omitted).
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and have quoted Olmstead's language that the ADA provides "a
clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities."'366 And one
federal court
has rejected a state's cost-based arguments as
"premature."367 But, there are, as of yet, no cases that seriously
reconceptualize the LRA after Olmstead in ways suggested in
this Article. On the other hand, it is reasonable
to suggest more
368
creative litigation in the coming years.

In Gates of Eden, Bob Dylan shared a vision of the otherworldly. "[T]here are no trials inside the Gates of Eden."369 Like
so many of Dylan's key lines, this is ultimately ambiguous: Do
his words refer to legal trials, the trials of living, or something
else? Whichever interpretation (or interpretations) we prefer,
Dylan's vision is an egalitarian one ("There are no kings inside
the Gates of Eden"),370 based on pure freedom ("Leaving men
wholly, totally free/To do anything they wish to do but die").37 '
Like Gates, the Americans with Disabilities Act-seen initially as
a type of Emancipation Proclamation 372 -made "promises of
paradise"373 for persons with disabilities. By its focus on the
ravages of institutional segregation, Olmstead may, in some very
important ways, make that promise real.

366.
Kirbens v. Wyoming State Bd. of Med., 992 P.2d 1056, 1061 (Wyo. 1999).
367.
Lewis v. New Mexico Dep't of Health, 94 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1239 (D.N.M. 2000)
("Given the Supreme Courtes holding that unjustified isolation does constitute disability
discrimination under the ADA and that the right to integrated placements is a limited
one, the Court finds Defendants' argument that the integration mandate impermissibly
requires state expenditures premature at best.").
368.
Wrote John Parry soon after Olmstead was decided:
Fundamentally, it expands the possibilities for persons in state-run mental
institutions. Until Olmstead, the Court was suspicious of any kind of
constitutionally based right to services in the community or least restrictive
setting. In the past, the foundation of de-institutionalization was the absence of
dangerousness to self or others, not the appropriateness of treatment or
essential services in non-institutional settings. . . . The ADA's integration of
service mandate, however, presented a new opportunity for advocates to obtain
appropriate community-based services from the states, but many states argued
that Title II did not obligate them to provide such services. Now that obligation
is beyond dispute.
John W. Parry, The Supreme Court Interprets the ADA, 23 MENTAL & PHYSIcAL
DisABiLrrY L. REP. 454, 456 (1999) (citations omitted).
369.
DYLAN, supra note 33, at 175.
370.
Id. at 174.
371.
Id. at 175.
372. Refer to note 204 supra.
373.
DYLAN, supranote 33, at 174.

